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Soli Özel – “America and the Middle East ” - Alternatives Internationale

2008-05-29T13:32:00.000+03:00

The American “war of choice” against Iraq as part of a grand project to transform the Middle East and to shape the world order by military fiat has failed. Today despite the limited, and arguably reversible, successes of the “surge”, the United States is not any nearer to accomplish this mission.

Even in its failure though the war changed, indeed transformed, the political and strategic landscape of the region. With the fall of the Baathi regime in Iraq, the majority Shi’a came to rule this critical Arab country. Shi’a elsewhere began to ask more aggressively for their citizenship rights and Hizbullah in Lebanon with the support of Syria and Iran challenged both the domestic political structure of Lebanon and the military might of Israel. Through Hizbullah, Iran the unintended main beneficiary in strategic terms of the American war against Saddam Hussein’s regime and gained much advantage in the Gulf region, also acquired a presence in Eastern Mediterranean.

By destroying the Iraqi regime and throwing the country into turmoil the United States also took the balancer to Iran in the Gulf out of the equilibrium. Given the fact that the rulers of Iraq today, the Da’wa Party or Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (formerly SCIRI) are Iran’s allies also meant that the strategic rise of Iran has also been compounded by significant influence in Iraq until the country settles down.

Such an advantageous strategic condition for Iran scared the Sunni Arab Gulf regimes and turned them into the low profile but keen allies of Israel. Tel Aviv loudly expresses its discomfort with Iran’s rising power, its nuclear program and the strategic challenge Tehran poses to Israel both by its own posturing and through the activities of its allies in the region, notably Hizbullah and to a lesser extent, Hamas. In Syria the Ba’thi regime that was once considered to be at razor’s edge after the assassination of Rafiq Hariri that brought Damascus the ire of Saudi Arabia and isolation in the Arab world and beyond is more relaxed. Despite the open animosity of Washington against the regime of Beshar al Asad, the Syrians hold their own and are bargaining hard to return to Lebanon in their own terms as they open second-track negotiations with Israel through the good offices of the Turkish government.

The next American administration will need to deal with this strategic landscape in the Middle East while the precariousness of the Afghan war and the fragility of Pakistan’s politics still continue. Arguably the most important decision to be made by the upcoming administration will be how to handle relations with Iran once that country elects its new President as well in 2009. Thirty years after the Iranian Revolution, Tehran and Washington face the need to decide between themselves the division of hegemony in the Persian Gulf.

The latest events in Lebanon whereby Hizbullah forcefully challenged the Lebanese government that is backed by most Arab regimes and the United States underscored the inability of the United States to single-handedly determine the pace and direction of events. That Hizbullah ultimately acted with restraint and accepted the position of the army as an arbiter showed that the final goal is not one of dominance but a new power sharing arrangement. Undoubtedly this was also a message on the part of Iran that it did not wish to totally disrupt the Arab order.

Can this be another instance of Iranian-American cooperation like the tacit cooperation that goes on in Baghdad alongside the strategic rivalry between Washington and Tehran as some commentators argue? It is quite obvious by now that without the assistance of Iran the United States will not be able to provide stability by itself including in Afghanistan. The fact that Washington is unable or unwilling to pull all its weight to broker an agreement between Israel and the Palestinians that would include all parties and be considered fair undermines its own position as the ultimate arbiter of a settlement in the whole of the Middle East.

The next American administration then will have to prepare its positions with these realities in mind. Many observers suspect or fear, depending on their stance, a military attack against Iran’s nuclear facilities before the Bush administration is removed from the stage. As much as the vice President’s office, Sunni Arab states and Israel may wish this to happen, the mood in the country including the elite and the military is not favorable to such an option unless Iran provokes it. As Andrew Bachevich notes “The United States today finds itself with too much war and too few warriors”. Furthermore the limits of military power to attain strategic objectives were made all to clear by the Iraq debacle.

Therefore the next American President is more likely to try non-military means to solve strategic problems and advance American strategic interests in the Middle East and beyond. The issue of withdrawing the troops from Iraq will be the most complex and difficult that the next administration will face. The United States will still want to control access to the world’s energy resources and its presence in the region will continue for the relevant future. Still, the domestic public opinion has turned against the costly war and the military wishes to avoid further straining its institutional health.

The decision to withdraw is a risky one since this would indeed leave a void in Iraq that is likely to unleash conditions for full-scale civil war. The Iraqi state is not yet strong enough to provide security and order as the disintegration of the military during the recent battles in Basra amply demonstrated. Violent instability in Iraq will have repercussions throughout the region. At the limit should Iraq disintegrate, all states in the region will face similar pressures. This is one of the reasons why the dynamics of the region itself will not favor or allow such an eventuality.

As I suggested earlier the United States has the option of accommodation or confrontation with Iran. The latter option, if taken, will further destabilize the region. So, the logical course to take would be accommodation. In this case Iran’s own behavior and whether or not it, too, will be carried away by hubris may determine the outcome. As for the United States the war in Iraq may have taught the American system to know the limits of its enormous power.

IN today’s Middle East it is almost impossible to attain strategic goals without taking into account the interests and the relative power of different players. This imposes upon the United States to seek cooperation and privileges diplomacy and negotiation over military might to pursue her goals. In fact, a regime as weak as the Syrian one successfully defied Washington. It managed to maintain its positions as well as undermine the American efforts in Lebanon.

Although the strategic center of gravity of the region has shifted decisively to the Gulf, the irresolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict still presents an obstacle to the realization of any great design. For that reason as big a challenge as the relations with Iran and how to find a balance with Tehran is, ending the conflict in the Holy Land may prove to be still as difficult a nut to crack as any.

Brzezinski & Odom - A Sensible Path on Iran

2008-05-27T22:07:00.000+03:00

By Zbigniew Brzezinski and William Odom
Tuesday, May 27, 2008; A13

Current U.S. policy toward the regime in Tehran will almost certainly result in an Iran with nuclear weapons. The seemingly clever combination of the use of "sticks" and "carrots," including the frequent official hints of an American military option "remaining on the table," simply intensifies Iran's desire to have its own nuclear arsenal. Alas, such a heavy-handed "sticks" and "carrots" policy may work with donkeys but not with serious countries. The United States would have a better chance of success if the White House abandoned its threats of military action and its calls for regime change.

Consider countries that could have quickly become nuclear weapon states had they been treated similarly. Brazil, Argentina and South Africa had nuclear weapons programs but gave them up, each for different reasons. Had the United States threatened to change their regimes if they would not, probably none would have complied. But when "sticks" and "carrots" failed to prevent India and Pakistan from acquiring nuclear weapons, the United States rapidly accommodated both, preferring good relations with them to hostile ones. What does this suggest to leaders in Iran?

To look at the issue another way, imagine if China, a signatory to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and a country that has deliberately not engaged in a nuclear arms race with Russia or the United States, threatened to change the American regime if it did not begin a steady destruction of its nuclear arsenal. The threat would have an arguable legal basis, because all treaty signatories promised long ago to reduce their arsenals, eventually to zero. The American reaction, of course, would be explosive public opposition to such a demand. U.S. leaders might even mimic the fantasy rhetoric of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad regarding the use of nuclear weapons.

A successful approach to Iran has to accommodate its security interests and ours. Neither a U.S. air attack on Iranian nuclear facilities nor a less effective Israeli one could do more than merely set back Iran's nuclear program. In either case, the United States would be held accountable and would have to pay the price resulting from likely Iranian reactions. These would almost certainly involve destabilizing the Middle East, as well as Afghanistan, and serious efforts to disrupt the flow of oil, at the very least generating a massive increase in its already high cost. The turmoil in the Middle East resulting from a preemptive attack on Iran would hurt America and eventually Israel, too.

Given Iran's stated goals -- a nuclear power capability but not nuclear weapons, as well as an alleged desire to discuss broader U.S.-Iranian security issues -- a realistic policy would exploit this opening to see what it might yield. The United States could indicate that it is prepared to negotiate, either on the basis of no preconditions by either side (though retaining the right to terminate the negotiations if Iran remains unyielding but begins to enrich its uranium beyond levels allowed by the Non-Proliferation Treaty); or to negotiate on the basis of an Iranian willingness to suspend enrichment in return for simultaneous U.S. suspension of major economic and financial sanctions.

Such a broader and more flexible approach would increase the prospects of an international arrangement being devised to accommodate Iran's desire for an autonomous nuclear energy program while minimizing the possibility that it could be rapidly transformed into a nuclear weapons program. Moreover, there is no credible reason to assume that the traditional policy of strategic deterrence, which worked so well in U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and with China and which has helped to stabilize India-Pakistan hostility, would not work in the case of Iran. The widely propagated notion of a suicidal Iran detonating its very first nuclear weapon against Israel is more the product of paranoia or demagogy than of serious strategic calculus. It cannot be the basis for U.S. policy, and it should not be for Israel's, either.

An additional longer-range benefit of such a dramatically different diplomatic approach is that it could help bring Iran back into its traditional role of strategic cooperation with the United States in stabilizing the Gulf region. Eventually, Iran could even return to its long-standing and geopolitically natural pre-1979 policy of cooperative relations with Israel. One should note also in this connection Iranian hostility toward al-Qaeda, lately intensified by al-Qaeda's Web-based campaign urging a U.S.-Iranian war, which could both weaken what al-Qaeda views as Iran's apostate Shiite regime and bog America down in a prolonged regional conflict.

Last but not least, consider that American sanctions have been deliberately obstructing Iran's efforts to increase its oil and natural gas outputs. That has contributed to the rising cost of energy. An eventual American-Iranian accommodation would significantly increase the flow of Iranian energy to the world market. Americans doubtless would prefer to pay less for filling their gas tanks than having to pay much more to finance a wider conflict in the Persian Gulf.

Zbigniew Brzezinski was national security adviser in the Carter administration and is the author, most recently, of "Second Chance." William Odom, a retired Army lieutenant general, is a former director of the National Security Agency. Both are affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/05/26/AR2008052601740_pf.html

Forecast for the next decade

2008-05-13T17:34:00.000+03:00

Yedioth Ahronoth

http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3540899,00.html

Forecast for the next decade

Ron Ben-Yishai foresees nuclear Iran, northern war, but also a stronger, more advanced IDF
Ron Ben-Yishai 05.08.08

First, a personal comment: Everyone knows that since the destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem, prophecy is given to fools, and that 10 years in the Middle East are more or less equal to eternity. Yet when I was asked to write my own forecast for Israel’s 60th Independence Day I couldn’t fight the temptation. Yet as opposed to a prophecy, an assessment for the next decade is a challenge that forces one to ask: Does the current security and diplomatic activity have a chance to improve our situation in the future, and is there a chance that in 10 years we will see peace prevail? Therefore, despite the risk that I will be proven wrong, I will attempt to answer.

My forecast is based on the assumption that current trends in the world and in the Middle East will continue in the next decade and may even intensify. We should also recall that 10 years are, more or less, the time required to develop new weapon systems. The Israeli experience also proves that every 10 years on average we face war or a major military campaign. Therefore, below I detail the main developments that in my estimate will take place within the next decade:

Radical militant Islam will attempt to take over Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Pakistan, and Iraq – but it will start the process of fading away. We are not only talking about global Jihad, but also local Jihad movements. The main reason for this is their failure to produce, over time, new operational and political success stories. The West, Russia, and China, as well as the secular Muslim regimes, will cooperate and learn to “contain” the radical Islamic groups. Meanwhile, the masses will be disappointed by the extremist groups’ inability to provide their basic needs and improve their quality of life.

The United States will continue to maintain its military and civilian presence in Iraq and operate militarily against Iranian targets that assist Iraqi terror. NATO forces will continue to operate alongside American units and civilian aid groups in Afghanistan. In both regions, the extent of Western forces and aid will be smaller compared to the current situation.

Rising food prices and natural disasters, which will become more frequent because of global warming, will increase the dependence of Muslim and Arab states on wealthy Western countries that boast highly developed agriculture and the ability to offer aid of all kinds in order to cope with natural disasters. This is also true with regards to the Muslim oil exporters, which will have to spend more money on food, desalination, and basic necessities – and less money on arms.

Iran will acquire military nuclear capabilities and will also possess various strategic launching means. The international community and Israel will not be able to prevent it. As a result, more Mideastern countries will launch their own nuclear activity.

Iran, Syria, Hizbullah, and Egypt will accumulate thousands of missiles and rockets that will be accurate, long-ranged, and fitted with larger warheads than in the past. In addition, they will possess modern anti-tank rockets and will significantly improve, through Russian equipment and independent development, their aerial defense systems. All of the above will boost their ability to sow destruction in Israel’s territory, and make it more difficult for our ground forces and Air Force to operate in their territory.

In the next 10 years, we will see several more wide-scale clashes between Israel and the Palestinians and possibly with Syria and Hizbullah as well. After these clashes and as a result of them, we will secure partial diplomatic agreements with the Palestinians, as well as with Syria and Lebanon, with active international backing and participation.But those will still not be full peace treaties.

The administrations of the next two American presidents will continue to support Israel diplomatically and militarily, and will attempt to advance peace agreements, more or less in line with the current format.

In light of the above, I estimate that Israeli governments will continue to adhere to Ben-Gurion’s security doctrine, that is: Avoid war as much as possible via deterrence and diplomatic maneuvers; build and maintain intelligence deterrence power that would enable us to thwart war and prepare for it in advance; and if war is forces upon us, or if Israel initiates war in order to thwart a clear and tangible threat to destroy us – the IDF will win it by defeating the enemy in its own territory; Israel will build its defense force while utilizing its human and technological advantage and with American assistance; on the diplomatic front, Israel will work to advance peace treaties in stages, in a way that preserves Washington’s support and the international legitimacy for our existence and for our defense efforts.

The implementation of the above principles will likely lead to the maturation of several processes in the next decade:

A multilayered system for intercepting ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, aircraft, and rockets of all types and sizes will be deployed in Israel (this system will also include laser-based systems.) The home front will undergo an intensive process of fortification and preparation for non-conventional attacks. In Tel Aviv, Haifa, Beer Sheba, and Dimona we will be in the process of constructing huge public bomb shelterspublic will undergo drills that will simulate evacuations and long-term stay in bomb shelters. (some of them will have dual purposes such as a subway for example.) The

Israel will possess a long strategic arm that would be able to provide an offensive response not only to the Iranian nuclear threat but also to conventional and non-conventional threats posed by other countries in the region. This strategic arm, which will enjoy high survivability, will have four capabilities: Long-distance warning premised on independent intelligence capabilities as well as the global American alert system; the ability to intercept and destroy various types of missiles and rockets on enemy territory or in early stages of launching, via unmanned aircraft; the ability to deliver a long-range “preventative strike” or “advanced strike” on enemy territory; the ability to deliver both a short-range and long-range “second strike” in case Israel is attacked. These strategic arm capabilities, most of which have been published in the foreign media, will be significantly upgraded when Israel acquires from the US one or two squadrons of stealth-type JSF F-35 fighter jets and when the Navy receives the two new submarines being built for it in Germany.

The IDF’s ground forces will maintain their current format and scope, with the possible addition of one or two divisions. However, they will be boosted by highly advanced weapons and protective means, which will provide the forces with currently non-existent maneuvering and survivability capabilities in a battlefield replete with anti-tank weapons. The emphasis will be placed on quick movements that would enjoy uninterrupted and tight support and cover from the air in terms of firepower, intelligence, and logistics. The combat divisions will also possess their own heavy and accurate weapons as well as independent logistic abilities.

The Navy will possess five Dolphin submarines and possibly another missile frigate,protection of our shores against terror infiltration and the prevention of arms smuggling to Gaza will be increasingly based on unmanned vessels to be operated in every sector by mother ships or from the shore. which will be part of its strategic arm. On the other hand, the

The overall trend in the IDF would be to boost to the maximum the utilization of advanced military technologies and unmanned platforms across the military. In 10 years, a significant part of our combat soldiers – in the sea, air, and land – will apparently be the operators of unmanned systems.

As to our northern front, and I hope I am proven wrong here, we will likely see another war.

Part 2 of Ron Ben Yishai’s analysis to be published Thursday evening

http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3541024,00.html

Forecast for the next decade

Part 2: Ron Ben-Yishai says Palestinians won’t have a state, but Iran will possess nukes
Ron Ben-Yishai

Ron Ben-Yishai continues his analysis of what lays ahead for Israel in the next decade:

As to our northern front, and I hope I am proven wrong here, we will likely see another war. I am daring to assume that this confrontation, should it take place, will end with a clear Israeli victory. That is: After about two weeks of aerial and ground combat, the missile and rocket attacks from Syria and Lebanon will end or be limited to several dozen short-range rockets a day. Syria and Lebanon will plead for a Security Council ceasefire.

Israel will suffer significant destruction of property, but the number of casualties among civilians would be relatively small. In Syria and Lebanon, on the other hand, the extent of devastation and casualties would be unprecedented in the history of Mideastern wars. Iran will issue threats and may send a symbolic force to Syria, but it will not be involved in the fighting.

Following the war and as a result of it, diplomatic negotiations will be launched that will see Israel agree to partial withdrawal on the Golan Heights as well as the demilitarization an the area that extends up to the Sea of Galilee. Syria will in turn agree to lease the rest of the Golan to Israel for a period of 99 years, and would also accept internationally monitored security arrangements and phased normalization of ties.

In Lebanon, Hizbullah will continue to be the dominant force – yet as a result of the war, Iranian support for the organization will weaken and it would be forced to compromise and share power with other sects in the country. Meanwhile, its appetite for yet another confrontation with Israel will grow smaller.

It is reasonable to assume that even in 10 years we will not see the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The talks will continue and may even lead to a “shelf agreement,” yet it’s doubtful whether it will be implemented. The Palestinian people’s political maturation process, which would enable them to assume responsibility for themselves and for the security of their neighbors, will continue, but it will not be reaching the required critical mass. This apparently won’t happen until the radical Islamic wave will fade.

It is also doubtful whether Israel will see the emergence of a government with the political power required to dismantle the settlements and outputs located beyond the large settlement blocs. Therefore, we will likely witness, in the next 10 years, more than one wide-scale IDF operation in Gaza, as well as yet another Intifada or two in the West Bank. The result would be reinforcement of Gaza as a separate entity. It would be jointly managed by a multinational force and a Palestinian coalition that would also include Hamas.

Israel will construct a “smart” wall around the Strip that will prevent direct fire and the digging of tunnels. This wall will feature crossings for goods and people, yet most supplies and movement into and out of the Strip – including goods, fuel, and electricity – will come via Egypt. The Rafah Crossing will become the main crossing. Meanwhile, the airport that Israel built years ago will serve as the Strip’s airport. A seaport will be under construction as well as a large desalination plant.

In the West Bank we will likely see a new political force rise up on the ruins of the old and corrupt Fatah. Mahmoud Abbas will step down, as will other members of the “Tunisia generation.” The new political movement will be headed by a collective leadership that will be based on Arafat’s Fatah young guard (either with or without Barghouti.) This group, most of whose members spent time in Israeli prisons, will be better equipped to engage in dialogue and agree on a compromise with Israel. After the third Intifada will die down, Israel will dismantle several isolated outposts and settlementshand over more territory to the Palestinian Authority. and

Along the borderlines with the Palestinians, Egyptians, and in the north we will see a fence or wall that will feature advanced technological means, thereby requiring less troops. In the West Bank, the Shin Bet and IDF will continue to engage in anti-terror activity in its current format, but they will have more technological means at their disposal. The major change will be the absence of roadblocks within the West Bank, thereby allowing for free Palestinian movement. Orderly and well-equipped border crossings – between the West Bank and Israel and between the West Bank and Jordan – will enable controlled, secure, and relatively quick movement.

As noted, I estimate that Iran will possess military nuclear capabilities in 10 years. Tehran will not admit to this, but hint at it. The United States and Israel will not be putting the military option into practice. However, the international community will tighten the sanctions and economic siege on Iran based on the assumption that skyrocketing food prices and ecological disasters will increase the Ayatollah regime’s dependency on developed countries, and mostly on the world’s leading food producer – the United States.

It is very possible that in 10 years, and maybe even before that, we will see the opening of negotiations between Tehran and the West in line with the North Korean model. The Ayatollahs will bargain with the West on a “nukes in exchange for grain” deal.

At the end of the negotiations, Iran will agree to reveal and dismantle its military nuclear capabilities and subject them to monitoring in exchange for the lifting of sanctions and ongoing supply of food and other aid. Another reasonable possibility is that due to the food crisis pressure and other domestic problems, the Ayatollah regime will collapse, and the Jews shall rejoice, God willing.

Turkey Increasingly Shuns U.S. Weapons

2007-07-16T14:40:00.000+03:00

By UMIT ENGINSOY, WASHINGTON And BURAK EGE BEKDIL, ANKARA

Recent Turkish procurement practices that favor non-U.S. suppliers in key defense programs may indicate a larger tendency to avoid the purchase of American weapons where the Turks easily can find alternatives, analysts and industry sources said.

“At some point in a not-so-distant future, we may see that Turkey practically buys only fighter aircraft and related services from the United States, and almost nothing else,” one Ankara-based analyst said.

Turkey’s ongoing complaints over what it sees as the United States’ strict restrictions on technology transfer and other sale difficulties have prompted the NATO ally to seek closer industry ties with other suppliers, the analyst said.

This year, Turkish procurement authorities have shunned U.S. products in three programs collectively worth billions of dollars, selecting an Italian-British group for attack helicopters, and South Korean companies for trainer aircraft and main battle tanks.

The United States has been Turkey’s closest Western ally and largest weapon supplier since World War II. The defense-industrial relationship has two aspects: government-to-government purchases from the United States, Washington’s Foreign Military Sales based on(FMS) mechanism; and commercial sales, in which U.S. companies usually have to compete with rivals from other countries. It is the second category in which the Americans are struggling.

The government-to-government sales will continue to flourish, with Turkey set to buy new fighter aircraft and related services worth nearly $15 billion over the next 10 to 15 years. These include a Turkish plan to buy 100 next-generation F-35 Joint Strike Fighter jets worth $10.7 billion; a recent contract for the sale to the Turkish Air Force of 30 F-16 Block 50 fighters worth $1.85 billion; and an ongoing modernization of older Turkish F-16s for $1.1 billion. In all these cases, Lockheed Martin is the prime contractor.

In addition, Turkey buys various types of Air Force and naval missiles and other services under FMS deals.

But commercial sales are faltering. The only recent commercial contract won by the United States is last year’s $580 million purchase of 17 S-70B Seahawk naval warfare helicopters. And Sikorsky was the sole source in that deal.

U.S. Government Complains

The U.S. government and companies blame the deterioration on the Turkish procurement agency’s strict rules of acquisition that took effect in 2005.

In unusually candid language, a senior Pentagon official recently accused the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM), Turkey’s procurement agency, of “hindering Turkey’s military modernization, interoperability with NATO allies and U.S.-Turkey defense industry cooperation.”

“Onerous terms and conditions — liability, work share, technology transfer and upfront U.S. government approval requirements in Turkey’s standard contracts — have kept U.S. firms from bidding,” Daniel Fata, deputy assistant secretary of defense for Europe and NATO, told a House of Representatives panel March 15.

Since then Turkey has selected the Italian-British AgustaWestland, maker of the A-129 Mangusta International, for its $2.7 billion attack helicopter program. Ankara also has opted for the KT-1 Woongbi, developed by South Korea’s Korea Aerospace Industries, for the $450 million trainer aircraft contract. As the model for Turkey’s national tank program, South Korea’s XK-2 platform, made by the Agency for Defense Development, has been chosen. With follow-on contracts, the South Korean share in this deal may exceed $1 billion.

U.S. companies were nonplayers in all three programs, with leading manufacturers, including Boeing, Bell Helicopter Textron and Raytheon, even failing to bid. The U.S. firms said the Turkish terms and conditions were not compatible with U.S. export laws and regulations.

Earlier, U.S. company General Atomics lost a nearly $200 million UAV deal to Israel’s Israel Aerospace Industries.

“Winning Turkish contracts is becoming increasingly difficult for U.S. firms, and we’re not happy about that at all,” one U.S. industry official said.

Turkish procurement officials deny charges of discrimination, with SSM chief Murad Bayar saying that his agency had softened terms and conditions to enable U.S. participation. But Bayar and other officials also say that companies from other countries do not share U.S. complaints.

“The Turks, to borrow their language, are kind of fed up with U.S. restrictions on technology transfer and other sale problems, and are effectively telling the Americans that as long as they can find equivalent systems from less problematic suppliers, they will prefer non-U.S. solutions,” the Ankara-based analyst said. “And I see no reason for the Turks to change this approach in the foreseeable future.”

One exception in Turkey’s recent preference for non-U.S. systems for commercial deals is helicopters.

Sikorsky Aircraft, maker of the S-70 Black Hawk International, is expected to win an ongoing tender for 32 military utility helicopters for $500 million over European rivals. Boeing’s CH-47 Chinook is seen as an early favorite in an upcoming program for heavy-lift helicopters.

Although not directly related, the faltering U.S. commercial sales to Turkey come at a time of deteriorating political relations, mainly because of the Iraq war and increased terrorist attacks inside Turkey by separatist Kurdish rebels based in northern Iraq. Ankara’s calls on Washington and Baghdad to put an end to the presence of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party in Iraq so far have produced no visible result.

Turkey has emerged as the world’s “most anti-U.S. country,” according to this year’s annual global poll by the Pew Research Center, released June 27. The poll’s results indicate only 9 percent of Turks have favorable views of the United States, Pew said. •

E-mail: umenginsoy@defensenews.com, bbekdil@defensenews.com

FT REPORT - GREECE: Rising prosperity brings feel-good facto

2007-07-15T04:20:00.000+03:00

By Kerin Hope, Financial Times

Published: Jul 13, 2007

Greece's reputation for presenting unreliable statistics that flatter its public accounts has long undermined its credibility with European partners.

Those days may be over, however.

In May, the Athens government received a green light to exit the European Commission's excessive budget deficit procedure, ending almost three years of close scrutiny by Eurostat, the organisation's audit arm.

The 2006 budget deficit fell to 2.6 per cent of gross domestic product - the first time it had fallen within the 3 per cent of GDP limit set for members of the eurozone since Greece joined the currency in 2001. This year, the deficit is projected to shrink only marginally to 2.5 per cent of GDP.

However, backsliding is not an option, says George Alogoskoufis, the finance minister. "We're preparing for larger cuts next year. As a eurozone member, we're committed to balancing the budget by 2010," he says.

Eurostat is expected to approve later this year a revision of the national accounts - the first in more than 20 years - that shows an increase in GDP by as much as 25.7 per cent annually since 1994.

Improved information-gathering has enabled the state statistical service to capture more activity in the fast-growing services sector, along with a larger percentage of the thriving grey economy.

Based on the revisions, the budget deficit would shrink by up to half a percentage point. But the impact on Greece's public debt, the highest in the eurozone as a percentage of GDP, would be much larger. The debt would fall at a stroke from 104 to 85 per cent of GDP.

Greek per capita income would receive a significant boost too. In terms of purchasing power parity, the Greeks would outpace their Mediterranean neighbours Spain and Italy to become almost as well off as the French.

The revisions reflect the impact of a decade of growth at about 4 per cent a year - a rate that should be sustained over the medium-term, Mr Alogoskoufis says. He notes that the economy expanded in the first quarter by as much as 4.6 per cent on an annualised basis.

Growth is driven by strong consumption and high investment, underpinned by transfers worth €22bn over eight years from the latest EU structural package. The jump in Greece's per capita income resulting from the statistical revision is not expected to affect current levels of EU funding.

"There's a feel-good effect and a neighbourhood effect," explains Paul Mylonas, chief economist at National Bank of Greece. "People in the private sector are investing quite a lot, and economies in the neighbouring countries, increasingly important export markets for Greece, are growing fast."

Larger Greek companies are deepening their presence in Bulgaria and Romania following their EU accession. Smaller companies are finding opportunities in the less-developed markets of the western Balkans.

Shipping and tourism,the main growth drivers together with cross-border expansion, are benefiting from a buoyant global economy.

Investment in new tonnage is at record levels. Tourism bookings are at a 10-year high, thanks to a recovery in Germany, the biggest market for Greece, and rising numbers of American, Chinese and Russian visitors.

Mr Alogoskoufis says the benign climate provides an opportunity to crack down on widespread tax evasion among small businesses and Greece's high percentage of self-employed workers, from plumbers to doctors and lawyers.

A previous campaign aimed at corporate tax evaders has borne fruit, thanks to improved electronic cross-checking of invoices and payments, and tighter enforcement by the finance ministry's special police unit.

But as a percentage of GDP, tax receipts are among the lowest in the EU, at a little below 20 per cent according to the revisedstatistics.

"We need to engage both the public and the social partners.

"There'll be incentives for households to ask for receipts, for example, for repair jobs, and measures to encourage the reporting of extortionary practices during tax audits," Mr Alogo-skoufis says.

Yearly reductions have cut corporate tax rates from 27 to 22 per cent. Rates for personal income tax are also being reduced. But the tax code remains complex, with overlapping legislation that is open to different interpretations by middle-ranking revenue officials.

Yannis Stournaras, an Athens University economics professor, says that the tax system needs a thorough overhaul.

He says: "There are some tough choices to be made in order to maintain revenue growth. There are few alternatives to raising VAT, but it also needs to be better administered. And the government has to consider introducing a capital gains tax."

As Greece enters the run-up to a general election, Mr Alogoskoufis faces pressure to loosen fiscal policy. He insists that next year's budget will not contain hand-outs for special interest groups.

But as the election campaign gets under way, it will become clear that the optimistic climate in Athens and other major cities does not extend to smaller towns and places off the tourist track. There are fewer new jobs in the provinces and income disparities are growing.

Although the jobless rate has fallen in the past three years from almost 11 per cent to about 9 per cent, it remains among the highest in the eurozone.

Unemployment is low among heads of households, but among young workers the rate exceeds 24 per cent, the highest in the EU.

"Measures to free the labour market are crucial," Mr Mylonas says.

"The minimum wage is far too high for inexperienced workers: it discourages employers from hiring.

"Such high rates of youth unemployment don't bode well for growth in the future."

NYT - Bush to Declare Gains in Iraq on Some Fronts

2007-07-12T15:06:00.000+03:00

July 12, 2007

By DAVID S. CLOUD and JOHN F. BURNS

WASHINGTON, July 11 — The Bush administration will assert in the next few days that progress in carrying out the new American strategy in Iraq has been satisfactory on nearly half of the 18 benchmarks set by Congress, according to several administration officials.

But it will qualify some verdicts by saying that even when the political performance of the Iraqi government has been unsatisfactory, it is too early to make final judgments, the officials said.

The administration’s decision to qualify many of the political benchmarks will enable it to present a more optimistic assessment than if it had provided the pass-fail judgment sought by Congress when it approved funding for the war this spring.

The administration officials who provided details of the draft report to The New York Times, insisting on anonymity, did so partly to rebut claims by members of Congress in recent days that almost no progress had been made in Iraq since President Bush altered course by ordering the deployment of about 30,000 additional troops earlier this year.

The report will land in the middle of a two-week Senate debate that has pitted advocates of an early American troop withdrawal against Mr. Bush, who wants to defer major policy decisions on Iraq until September, when a more comprehensive report is due from the top two Americans in Iraq, Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker and Gen. David H. Petraeus.

The White House report says the most progress has been achieved in the military realm. The American command’s latest unpublished monthly figures, prepared for the White House report, show a substantial decline in two major categories of violence, the number of Iraqi civilians killed in sectarian violence and casualties from car and truck bomb explosions.

But the report also acknowledges that some military benchmarks have not been met, including improvements in the ability and political neutrality of the Iraqi security forces and the Iraqi government. Even in some areas where the report will cite progress, the officials in Washington said the document would acknowledge that the overall goal of political reconciliation remained elusive and would chide the Iraqis for failing to take advantage of the presence of more American troops to take more far-reaching steps.

Administration officials said the report could be made public as early as Thursday, though the White House said the timing of the release had not been determined. At the same time, officials said, the White House would like to avoid giving Congress ammunition to use in seeking to enact restrictions on the United States military presence in Iraq.

The report will “not conclude, as it has been characterized, that this is a colossal failure,” one of the officials said. “It is a mixed bag, with some areas that are too early to pass judgment on.”

Several administration officials said that in the drafting of the report, which was done primarily at the National Security Council, officials tried to walk a fine line between giving a credible assessment of Iraq’s progress and giving the Iraqis an incentive, in the words of one official, “to improve their grades.”

Administration officials said the Pentagon had been much more willing than the State Department and the White House to make hard and fast calls about whether Iraqi progress was satisfactory.

An assessment of political progress provided to the House Armed Services Committee by Thomas Fingar, the deputy director for analysis at the National Intelligence Council, painted a much bleaker picture than the White House report, saying there were “few appreciable gains.”

The new military figures come from a sheaf of colored charts and graphs prepared by the American military command for submission to the White House. The documents say that sectarian killings in Baghdad declined to 300 in June, when the American force reached full strength, from 1,650 in January. Nationally, sectarian killings declined to 650 in June from 2,100 in January, according to the documents. The number of “high profile” bombings, including suicide attacks, fell below 90 in June from more than 180 in March.

In separate interviews in recent days, Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus, the top American commander in Iraq, have offered a subdued view of the military statistics, saying that while some measures of violence showed a downward trend, it was too early to suggest that there had been a lasting turnaround in the war.

Ambassador Crocker, in an interview on Saturday, was blunt in his assessment of the war. While “by Iraqi standards, June was a pretty good month,” he said, the figure of 650 sectarian killings showed that the situation remained grim. “If 20 people killed a day is good news, that tells you how bad things were previously,” he said. “The challenges here at every level remain just huge.”

But he said he believed that the United States could avoid disaster in Iraq, given enough time. “Do I think it can still be done?” he said. “Yes, I do. I’m just not sure if it can be done on the kind of time lines and with the kind of time pressures that the situation back home has generated.”

Other figures relayed in the report to Washington showed that Iraqi casualties from car and truck bombs, which have been the war’s biggest cause of injury and death, fell below 500 in June, including more than 200 casualties from one attack on a Shiite mosque in the Rusafa area of east Baghdad, compared with 1,100 in February. According to a detailed breakdown, vehicle bombings across Iraq fell to 40 in June, compared with 115 in March; suicide bombings fell to 30 from 48; and attacks by suicide vest bombers stayed nearly equal, with 18 in June, 2 fewer than in March.

Another measure of the Baghdad violence, the number of insurgent and militia attacks, went from 200 in a two-week period just before the troop increase began in mid-February to 390 in the first two weeks of June, before falling back to 240 in the second half of the month, according to the American figures.

A senior officer who helped compile the charts said the spike reflected the heightened tempo of American-led military operations in insurgent and militia strongholds across the city. “The attacks are up because we’re going into the neighborhoods picking fights,” he said.

General Petraeus was cautious in assessing the fall-off in what the military calls “high-profile attacks,” meaning bombings with parked vehicles that cause high casualties, and suicide attacks with bomb-laden vehicles or by militants wearing suicide vests. He noted that in early July there were a number of devastating attacks, including a suicide bombing in a village southwest of Kirkuk last week that killed more than 130 people.

“That had gone down for three months in a row, April, May and June, fairly substantially,” the general said. But he added, “We will have to see if that is sustained this month or not, because there have been a number, as you know, at the beginning of this month.”

The most striking success shown by the military figures was in the western desert province of Anbar, an area declared all but lost politically to insurgents by a Marine intelligence report in 2006. The number of attacks in Anbar declined to 225 in June from 1,300 in October, according to the military data.

American officers have attributed the success in Anbar to deals with Sunni tribal leaders exhausted with the brutalities of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, a largely Iraqi organization that American officers assert has foreign leadership. But the military says that the extremists, under pressure in Anbar, have moved the focus of their attacks elsewhere, including the troubled province of Diyala north of Baghdad, and the oil-rich city of Mosul in the north.

On the political front, none of the benchmarks that have been achieved include the high-profile legislation on which Congress asked to see progress. Debate has not yet begun in the Iraqi Parliament on the oil law or the revenue-sharing law, both of which are crucial to keeping Iraq united over the long term.

The most direct criticism of the government of Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki in the report, officials said, is for its failure to make headway on a law that would make it easier for former members of Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party to obtain government jobs. American officials consider the measure vital to any political reconciliation with Sunnis. Laws to disarm militias and to grant amnesty are still in their formative stages, and as a practical matter, disarming militias seems an all but impossible goal as more groups control swaths of territory.

In the report, Mr. Maliki’s government will be credited with taking steps toward forming a committee to review and overhaul the Iraqi Constitution and with making progress on “allocating and spending” its $10 billion budget for reconstruction projects, though officials privately say little of the money has been spent so far on projects.

In contrast to the White House report, Mr. Fingar’s assessment to the House committee was overtly critical. “The multiparty government of Nuri al-Maliki continues halting efforts to bridge the divisions and restore commitment to a unified country,” it concluded, “and it has made limited progress on key legislation.” But it added that “communal violence and scant common ground between Shias, Sunnis and Kurds continues to polarize politics,” and Mr. Maliki’s effort at reconciliation are “only at its initial stages.”

Mr. Crocker said in an interview that he did not expect the legislative benchmarks to be achieved in the coming weeks and that in his view those measures were less significant than whether the leaders of the different factions found a way to keep talking to one another. He said he had been encouraged by signs in recent weeks that a small group of leaders representing each of the major sectarian and ethnic blocs — including Mr. Maliki, a Shiite; President Jalal Talabani, a Kurd; and Tariq al-Hashemi, a Sunni — had met at times of crisis and spoken with a common voice.

General Petraeus appeared eager to send a message to lawmakers on Capitol Hill who have grown impatient with the war. “I can understand why the folks at one end of Pennsylvania Avenue could be frustrated, angry, disappointed and upset over the situation in Iraq,” he said, adding: “I share the same emotions, and I’m the one going to the memorial services. I went to a ceremony last night for five soldiers, and the night before for four.”

David S. Cloud reported from Washington, and John F. Burns from Baghdad. Michael R. Gordon and Alissa J. Rubin contributed reporting from Baghdad, and David E. Sanger from Washington.

The Times - Is the puny dollar a sign of America’s decline? by Anatole Kaletsky July 12, 2007

2007-07-12T14:24:00.001+03:00

Yesterday, the pound and the euro hit their highest levels in a generation against the US dollar. The dollar, meanwhile, collapsed to a record low against an average of all the world’s major currencies. It is tempting to interpret the flight from the dollar in financial markets as the clearest, most objective, indicator of America’s relative decline.

Europe has long been derided as an ageing, sclerotic continent, doomed to irrelevance in a world dominated by America and Asia. But could it actually be America, not Europe, that is failing to compete in the globalised world economy and is now threatened with long-term decline?

Much that is happening in the world today certainly seems to belie the hubristic assumptions about American hegemony that were so prevalent a few years ago. It is not just the military debacle in Iraq and the geopolitical setbacks suffered by American diplomacy from the Middle East to Venezuela to North Korea. Less prominent in the media headlines, but in some ways more troubling, are the indicators of economic underperformance: the reliance on foreign borrowing (now equivalent to $2,000 annually for every American man, woman and child); the loss of Wall Street’s global dominance in financial services to the City of London; and now to cap it all, the dollar collapsing to record lows. Surely this is the ultimate vote of no confidence in the US economy by people who are best placed to know?

Sadly, for those of us who live in Britain and Europe and would like to believe that the strength of our currencies reflects our superlative economic prospects, the answer is an emphatic “no”. There was a time in the 19th century when the strength of sterling reflected Britain’s unparalleled prosperity and imperial power. But, since the deregulation of currencies and financial markets in the 1980s and 1990s, currency strength has conveyed almost no information about the health of a national economy – and none at all about a country’s competitive position in global trade. For example, anyone who believes that the falling dollar reflects America’s huge trade deficit and foreign borrowing should consider that the one leading currency even weaker in the past three years than the dollar has been the yen; yet Japan has the world’s biggest trade surplus and is the greatest creditor nation the world has ever seen.

To the extent that any relationship has existed between currencies and economic performance, it has usually been the “wrong” way round – rising currencies usually preceded periods of economic decline, while weakening currencies have presaged economic strength. Think, for example, of the collapse of sterling in 1992, which ushered in the strongest and longest period of economic expansion in British history.

Or consider the strength of the US economy in the late 1990s, just after the dollar fell to its previous nadir in 1995. Even more spectacular has been the decade of growth in China since its currency collapsed to a record low in the Asian crisis of 1997. On the other side of the ledger, there has been Japan’s stagnation after 1995, when the yen hit a record high, and Germany’s lost decade after the surge in the mark that followed German reunification and the eurozone’s dismal economic performance from 2003 to 2005, as the newly created euro appreciated by 60 per cent against the dollar.

There are many explanations for the apparently perverse relationship between currencies and economic performance, though none of them is watertight. For example, currencies tend to strengthen in response to rising interest rates and fears of inflation – which are obviously bad for economic performance – but also in response to strong economic growth.

On the other hand, a currency may weaken because inflation prospects are improving, as they are in the US at present, or because investors fear a financial collapse, which some believe to be a looming in the US mortgage market. But if the causes of currency strength are ambiguous and contradictory, the consequences are clear. A currency that keeps rising, as the euro and sterling are at present, will eventually do serious damage to almost any economy, hurting export competitiveness and stunting growth.

This is what happened to Britain and America after the pound and the dollar appreciated excessively in the early 1980s and again in the early 1990s. It happened to Germany and Japan in the mid1990s and again in the middle of this decade to the eurozone. Europe and Britain enjoyed some relief in 2005, when the euro and the pound temporarily weakened.

But now they will have to bear the full brunt of excessive currency strength. In Britain’s case, the strength of the pound may not do too much harm, since it will forestall or at least delay any further rate rises from the Bank of England. On the Continent, however, the European Central Bank seems determined to keep raising interest rates, thereby exacerbating the damage done by the euro’s excessive strength.

Americans, meanwhile, will enjoy the benefits of a super-cheap currency, which will more than offset falling property prices and problems with a small minority of mortgage loans. American politicians, for all their faults, instinctively understand this, which is why they have generally welcomed a falling dollar and have been pressuring China and Japan to let the dollar weaken against the yen and the renmimbi – not just, as at present, against the euro and the pound.

European policymakers, by contrast, seem to have no idea of how currency markets operate. In contrast with Americans and Asians, German politicians in particular still see a “hard currency” as a virility symbol – not as a threat to economic performance or an indicator that interest rates are probably too high.

There is only one leading European politician who seems to understand the dangers of an overstrong euro. This is Nicolas Sarkozy, who travelled to Brussels this week to plead for a more expansionary economic policy in Europe. But his pleas were met with ridicule from the other governments and the ECB. Within two months of promising to spark an economic revival, the new French President has already been paralysed by the rules of the eurozone.

That is the reality of life in today’s Europe – and one of the main reasons why America, despite all its problems, will continue to dominate the world economy in the decades ahead.

IHT - Global governance, on average, little improved over last decade, says World Bank

2007-07-12T14:12:00.000+03:00

By Celia W. Dugger

Wednesday, July 11, 2007

NEW YORK: Africa, often characterized as a place of epic corruption and misrule, emerged in a World Bank report as a continent of great variety, with some countries making extraordinary progress over the past decade, while others have moved backwards.

The most comprehensive database on governance for more than 200 countries undermines the notion of "Afro-pessimism," the World Bank said in the report released Tuesday, and also established that industrialized, wealthy nations also struggle with corruption and bad governance.

The ratings of the United States and Italy on corruption have significantly worsened since 1998, and Chile, a middle-income developing country, now performs as well on this measure as the United States, according to the report. In fact, a dozen emerging economies, including Chile, Botswana, Uruguay, Costa Rica, Latvia and Lithuania, scored higher on the rule of law and controlling corruption than some industrialized countries, like Italy and Greece.

In Africa, Tanzania, Liberia, Rwanda, Ghana and Sierra Leone all made extraordinary progress on corruption over the past decade while Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast and Eritrea retreated, the report said.

Beyond Africa, the report documents other countries that are either making hopeful progress or regressing on various measures. Those with significant gains include Indonesia, Ukraine, Colombia, Turkey and Afghanistan. The backsliders include Bangladesh, Poland, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova and Pakistan.

The report did, however, find that the gains and losses balanced out such that the average quality of governance worldwide over the past decade has not improved much.

"It begins to challenge these long-held popular notions that the rich world has reached nirvana in governance," said Daniel Kaufmann, an author of the report who heads global programs at the World Bank Institute, the bank's knowledge-sharing and training arm.

After Paul Wolfowitz, then president of the World Bank, became mired in scandal this year over charges of favoritism, bank staff had to fight for the institution's own credibility in judging governance in the developing countries it serves.

Kaufmann said countries rightly asked the bank: "What right do you have of rating the world when you first have to rate yourselves? It has to start at home."

The vast database of information on governance, provided to the bank by 30 different organizations, is itself a measure of the bank's evolution on the centrality of the issue. It measured not only corruption and electoral democracy, but also respect for civil liberties, press freedom and human rights, as well as the openness of governmental operations.

Kaufmann became a leader of the World Bank's efforts to document the devastating effect of bad governance on economic development and the well-being of poor people more than a decade ago with the support of James Wolfensohn, then the bank's president, who in 1996 famously condemned what he called the "cancer of corruption," then largely a forbidden subject at the bank.

The report, authored by Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi of the World Bank, follows a decade of research culled from information provided by an ideologically diverse array of groups.

"This is the best data source on governance now," said Steve Radelet, a senior fellow at the Center for Global Development, a Washington research group. "Fifteen years ago, we didn't talk about this stuff."

The information fuels many debates on development, including whether prosperity leads to good governance or vice versa. Some of the governance indicators developed by the bank have been relied on by the Millennium Challenge, a U.S. agency that dispenses U.S. aid to poor countries based on how well they are governed.

LA Times - U.S. troop buildup in Iraq falling short

2007-07-11T14:37:00.000+03:00

THE CONFLICT IN IRAQ: GREEN ZONE DEATHS; STRATEGY DOUBTS; FAMILIAR BUSH THEME

Amid 'surge,' forces have been unable to establish security, even for themselves. Military leaders say they just need more time.

By Julian E. Barnes and Ned Parker
Times Staff Writers

July 11, 2007

BAGHDAD — In the Ubaidi neighborhood in the eastern part of this city, American soldiers hired a local Iraqi to clean the Porta-Potties at their combat outpost. Before the man could start, members of the local Shiite militia threatened to kill him.

Today, the Porta-Potties are roped off, and the U.S. soldiers, who could not promise to protect their sewage man, are forced to burn their waste.

As part of the Bush administration's troop "surge" strategy, the U.S. unit here had moved into an abandoned potato chip factory hoping to push out the militia, protect existing jobs and provide stability for economic growth. Instead, militia members stymied development projects, cut off the water supply and executed two young Iraqi women seen talking to U.S. soldiers, sending a powerful message about who really controls Ubaidi's streets.

In the next few days, the Bush administration is scheduled to release a preliminary assessment of its overall Iraq strategy. Officials may point to signs of progress scattered across the country: a reduction in death-squad killings in Baghdad, agreements with tribal leaders in Al Anbar province, offensives north and south of the capital.

President Bush defended his strategy Tuesday, demanding Congress give his administration more time and insisting that America can "win this fight in Iraq." To underscore his request, Bush sent top aides to lobby lawmakers on Capitol Hill.

But as the experience of the troops in Ubaidi indicates, U.S. forces so far have been unable to establish security, even for themselves. Iraqis continue to flee their homes, leaving mixed areas and seeking safety in religiously segregated neighborhoods. About 32,000 families fled in June alone, according to figures compiled by the United Nations and the Iraqi government that are due to be released next week.

U.S. forces have staged offensives to push insurgents out of some safe havens. But many of the insurgents have escaped to new areas of the country, launching attacks where the U.S. presence is lighter.

And there has been no sign of any of the crucial political progress the administration had hoped to see in Iraq.

U.S. commanders are painfully aware that they are running out of time to change those realities. Army Gen. David H. Petraeus, the top American commander in Iraq, has made several efforts to slow the clock in Washington. Each time, it has sped up.

The full complement of the "surge" arrived in Iraq last month, bringing the total to 28,500 additional troops. Military officers originally hoped to have until 2008 before they had to render a verdict on the strategy. Then the Washington timeframe shrank to September. Now, it is shrinking further, with Congress demanding answers even sooner.

Supporters of the troop buildup insist that small steps could grow into larger and more long-term successes if lawmakers are patient.

"Right now we are three weeks into this. It's not like flipping a light switch," said a military officer in Baghdad, expressing the frustration of many commanders. "Time has to be given for things to work."

Commanders point to Ramadi, the capital of Al Anbar province, as a showcase for the kind of results the military wants from the current strategy. Once a battlefield, the city is now largely peaceful, calm enough that in March, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Maliki was able to pay his first official visit.

But military officers stress that it took about nine months of sustained effort to make Ramadi a relatively pacified city. And with its volatile mix of Sunni and Shiite Muslims, Baghdad presents a far more complex challenge than all-Sunni Ramadi.

The interim progress report that Bush promised to release this week is likely to emphasize the success the military has had in killing Sunni militants in the "Baghdad belts," the cities and towns that dot the major rivers and highways leading to the capital. In recent weeks, the newly arrived U.S. forces have been focused on fighting members of Al Qaeda in Iraq, , a militant Sunni group made up of Iraqis and foreign fighters.

Top generals say the strategy is crucial to securing Baghdad. Only by controlling the routes into the capital, and denying militants safe havens, can the U.S. and Iraqi militaries keep out the car bombs that stoke sectarian violence inside the capital.

But leading Iraqis are less sure of the strategy.

Mahmoud Othman, a Kurdish member of the Iraqi parliament, said the U.S. approach may be successful at weakening Al Qaeda in Iraq. But he said Americans would not be able to solve Iraq's sectarian conflict or stop clashes between armed groups in Baghdad neighborhoods.

"The surge has an important effect in fighting Al Qaeda," the independent politician said. "On the Sunni-Shiite conflict, it hasn't had any effect…. Extremist Shiites and Sunnis are fighting each other. The Americans can't stop this."

U.S. officials have made little, if any, progress with their persistent calls for Iraqi officials to take steps toward reconciliation between Shiites and Sunnis.

Key administration officials, most prominently Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and Vice President Dick Cheney, have visited Iraq to push for passage of an oil-revenue sharing law, provincial elections and reform of rules barring members of the former ruling Baath Party from government jobs.

But the Iraqi government is bogged down by fighting among Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish parties. It is unclear whether the oil law, the one piece of benchmark legislation still given hopes for passage before September, will reach a vote any time soon.

The number of death-squad killings in the capital, one sign of sectarian divisions, is down from earlier this year. But the number remains roughly at the level seen after the 2006 bombing of Samarra's Golden Mosque, which served as a catalyst for the extreme sectarian violence.

In Baghdad, the number of bodies found dumped in the streets dropped to 540 last month from 830 in January. Some American officers say those numbers could rise again. And others say that the decline may simply represent the depressing reality that most Baghdad neighborhoods are now segregated, meaning there are fewer people left for death squads to kill.

Maj. Gen. Joseph Fil Jr., the commander of U.S. forces in Baghdad, said that American troops at the end of June controlled about 42% of the city's neighborhoods, up from 19% in April.

But to many Iraqis, that is little comfort.

"The Americans do not make me feel safe," said Amin Sadiq, a 30-year-old Shiite worker in the Ghadeer neighborhood of east Baghdad. "When you hear the speeches of the top U.S. military leaders, you think that everything is ideal and perfect and Iraq will be better. But when you see how the U.S. soldiers behave, I really feel I should not trust the leaders."

The American military has helped bring a tense truce in some areas, but has not re-integrated once-mixed neighborhoods.

The western Baghdad neighborhood of Ghazaliya, once a prosperous mixed middle-class area, was riven by sectarian violence in 2006. It is now divided between Shiites in the northern end and Sunnis in the south, with the U.S. military stuck in the middle, trying to keep the peace.

"Last year, things were bad. This year is worse than before," said a man in his 50s who identified himself as Qais Qaisi.

The presence of Iraqi and American security forces means that Sunnis cannot fight back against the Shiite militias, which have the tacit support of the Iraqi army unit in the area, Qaisi said. But he nevertheless voiced concern about a possible American pullout.

"If the multinational forces withdraw, there will be very bloody sectarian battles," he said.

Military officers routinely say that improving the economy is a prerequisite to improving security. And U.S. forces, by putting up barriers and controlling traffic, have been able to reopen some marketplaces that had been targeted by suicide bombers. Although that has allowed some neighborhood commerce, success with other projects has proved more elusive.

The Pentagon is working to reopen state-owned factories and has identified several dozen that can be renovated and restarted. But that work is slow, and many residents say they see few improvements in their neighborhoods.

Although U.S. forces have been able to overcome militia threats and start small neighborhood projects such as installing streetlights, they are not able to initiate larger undertakings.

"We aren't doing anything meaningful," said one mid-level noncommissioned officer. "Where are the real projects? We aren't offering these people enough safety, or money, or jobs."

Amid the political setbacks and continuing violence, however, there are signs of relative calm in some areas.

Earlier this year, the streets of Baghdad were desolate at sunset. Now, in places, there are signs of life.

In Yarmouk, a neighborhood in west Baghdad, 18-year-old Ahmed Shakir used to see bodies on the street every day. Snipers fired from hidden perches and gunmen clashed with U.S. and Iraqi soldiers. But last month, after weeks of U.S. patrols, his neighborhood started to feel safe — safe enough for Shakir to stay outside on the basketball court until 8:30 p.m.

"It is usually me and three of my friends, we always go play basketball," he said. "Now we have U.S. and Iraqi patrols roaming the streets every day. If they continued doing this, things will remain better. If not, then it will get worse for sure."

--

julian.barnes@latimes.com

ned.parker@latimes.com

Times staff writers Saif Hameed, Zeena Kareem, Mohammed Rasheed and Wail Alhafith contributed to this report.

NYT - Bush Counters G.O.P. Dissent on Iraq Policy

2007-07-11T14:19:00.000+03:00

July 11, 2007

By JEFF ZELENY and SHERYL GAY STOLBERG

WASHINGTON, July 10 — Fearful of a Republican rebellion over Iraq that his own aides believe could force him to change course, President Bush said Tuesday that the United States would be able to pull back troops “in a while,” but asked Congress to wait until September to pass judgment on a future military presence there.

Senator John McCain, Republican of Arizona, fresh from a trip to Iraq, joined in the call for patience, imploring lawmakers not to “let fatigue dictate our policies.” As the Senate began a two-week debate over a major military spending bill, the White House dispatched cabinet officials and advisers to urge other Republicans to stand by the president.

The administration’s message was spelled out in remarks Mr. Bush delivered in Ohio, in which the president signaled more clearly than before that he might be open to shifting toward a smaller, more limited mission in Iraq in the future — without stating precisely when.

“I’ll be glad to discuss different options,” Mr. Bush said to a business group in Cleveland. “I believe we can be in a different position in a while, and that would be to have enough troops there to guard the territorial integrity of that country, enough troops there to make sure that Al Qaeda doesn’t gain safe haven.”

While skepticism and pessimism about Iraq policy are evident in the voices of a growing number of lawmakers, including several prominent Republicans, even more Republicans spoke forcefully about their desire to continue the fight. It remains an open question whether a series of proposals, including those calling for troop withdrawal deadlines, will gain the 60 votes needed for initial passage in the Senate when the measures are scheduled to be considered next week.

As the debate began Tuesday, Mr. Bush’s national security adviser, Stephen J. Hadley, and his new Iraq coordinator, Lt. Gen. Douglas Lute, arrived on Capitol Hill to lobby senators, while Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates fielded phone calls from lawmakers in both parties. The officials were, effectively, previewing a progress report to be delivered to Congress by week’s end.

Senator Olympia J. Snowe, a Maine Republican, said she received a call on Tuesday morning from Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, urging her to wait until September to denounce the Bush policy. Ms. Snowe, who has previously opposed hard-and-fast deadlines for removing troops, said the time had come to change course in Iraq.

“The tide has turned,” Ms. Snowe said. “They obviously would prefer that we wait until September, but my view is that we should send a very strong message now.”

Among the proposals to be considered over the next two weeks is a plan requiring a troop withdrawal to begin within 120 days and to be completed by the end of April 2008. The sponsors of the plan, Senators Carl Levin of Michigan and Jack Reed of Rhode Island, both Democrats, said the legislation would allow troops to remain in Iraq for a limited mission of combating terrorism, training Iraqi forces and protecting American forces.

While debate over the Iraq war has dominated the first six months of the new Congress, Democrats have struggled to use their narrow majority to influence the administration’s policy. But Mr. Bush’s own words on Tuesday signaled the beginning of a White House counteroffensive aimed at emphasizing that, like Americans around the country, he, too, wants to bring troops home.

“I fully understand that when you watch the violence on TV every night, people are saying, ‘Is it worth it, can we accomplish an objective?’ ” Mr. Bush said. “Well, first I want to tell you, yes, we can accomplish this fight and win in Iraq. And secondly, I want to tell you, we must, for the sake of our children and grandchildren.” While Mr. Bush hinted in his remarks that he was open to exploring different options in the future, he did not expound on them in any significant detail, only broadly mentioning border protection and counterterrorism. He did not mention either providing security in Baghdad or training Iraqi troops, both of which remain central to the current American mission.

In a White House memorandum circulated on Capitol Hill and beyond, the administration said it was “too early to declare the surge a success or failure,” but highlighted what it called signs of progress, including “a substantial drop in sectarian murders in Baghdad since January,” “total car bombings and suicide attacks down in May and June” and “signs of normalcy in Baghdad like professional soccer leagues, amusement parks and vibrant markets.”

Even as several members of Congress said Tuesday that they were awaiting a progress report on Iraq this week before rendering their judgment, administration officials sought to play down the review of the benchmarks of progress in Iraq.

The document, required by Congressional budget legislation, is based on reports from senior commanders and diplomats in Iraq, and is being written in Washington by the National Security Council staff with participation from other departments, including State and Defense.

“This week started to take on greater importance than anyone in the administration had intended,” said one senior administration official, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss internal deliberations. “September is our window.”

The Republican senators who believe September is too late for a new strategy began huddling privately on Tuesday to begin discussing compromise legislation to change course in Iraq. Senators Richard G. Lugar of Indiana and Senator John W. Warner of Virginia are among those who are shaping such proposals.

At the same time, a string of Republicans stepped forward and voiced support for the president, while Democratic leaders accused Republicans of using procedural maneuvering to delay votes on the Iraq legislation.

Senator Christopher S. Bond, Republican of Missouri, said the critics were being hasty. “Do we not have the patience to see a totally new strategy, which is appearing to work, given a chance?” he asked.

But Senator Lamar Alexander, a Tennessee Republican, said the two-week Congressional debate needed to produce some signs of progress. He and Senator Ken Salazar, a Colorado Democrat, are proposing a bipartisan plan to put into law the provisions of last year’s Iraq Study Group report, which called for a gradual troop withdrawal and change of direction in the mission.

“At some point we’re going to have to stop shouting at each other and see what we can agree on,” Mr. Alexander said. “We owe that to our troops and we owe that to our country.”

Jeff Zeleny reported from Washington, and Sheryl Gay Stolberg from Cleveland. David M. Herszenhorn and Thom Shanker contributed reporting from Washington.

Jerusalem Post - The Region: Getting serious about Syria

2007-07-10T15:01:00.000+03:00

Barry Rubin, THE JERUSALEM POST

Jul. 9, 2007

'We must once again restore the Israeli army's deterrence, because there is no other way," explains Defense Minister Ehud Barak. Quite right. The place to start is Syria. Israel's strategic policy toward Syria should be based on two basic principles:

Israel should make the Syrians believe it wants to see the current regime there overthrown even if it has no intention of making this happen, or even really wants that outcome.

Israel should make clear that if there is a future Hizbullah attack leading to a war like last summer's, it is Syria, not Lebanon, that will be the main target of retaliation.

Let's review the issues and then discuss why this is the best policy. It is true that Israel does not seek the overthrow of President Bashar Assad's Ba'athist dictatorship, dominated by the Alawite minority. The reason is that the likely replacement would be an Islamist regime from the Sunni Arab majority. An alternative could be simply another Ba'athist regime under a different leader, but the risks of regime change are certainly real.

STRATEGY, however, is not just stating what you ultimately want, but also what you wish the other side to think you want. In Syria and throughout the Arab world, the idea is clearly held that Israel is not willing to strike so hard as to bring down the Assad regime. In turn, this emboldens that regime to strike hard at Israel, knowing it has little or nothing to fear. That security should be taken away from the Damascus regime. Clearly, Israel does not want war with Syria. Yet the whole concept of deterrence is to make clear to the Syrians that Israel is not afraid of war, and that Syrian support for terrorism against Israel will have real and costly consequences. Without this fear, there is no deterrence. And without deterrence, war - either directly with Syria or with Syria's clients in Lebanon - is far more likely.

The weakness of Syria should also be a factor in Israeli thinking. Despite the possibility of renewed Russian aircraft sales, Syria's military is badly outdated. A lot of the regime's threats and use of terrorism is a bluff, formulated precisely to distract from that fact. The Syrian regime has no great-power ally and cannot depend on a single Arab government. Of course, the one international asset Syria enjoys is its alliance with Iran.Yet especially in the period before Iran obtains nuclear weapons, Israel can and must press Syria hard - verbally and even covertly at regular intervals; materially if events require it.

THIS LEADS us to the second point. It could not be more obvious that the current Lebanese government is not really an enemy of Israel. While it might be incapable of making peace, it would prefer a quiet border and no conflict. The main enemy of the Lebanese government is not Israel, but Iran and Syria. Whether or not officials in Beirut say this openly, this is certainly what they think. The same goes for Hizbullah, which is the main threat to take over the government.

Given the fact that the vast majority of Christians, Druse and even Sunni Muslims do not want to participate actively in the Arab-Israeli conflict, their suffering in future clashes in that quarrel should be limited. Anything that weakens the Lebanese government and society is against Israel's interests.

Obviously, of course, this does not include direct strikes against Hizbullah, but there should be no such attacks against the Lebanese infrastructure, aside perhaps from roads being used as part of Hizbullah's military effort. To hold the Lebanese government responsible for Hizbullah - when it would love to rein in that group but cannot do so - is sheer folly.

It is clear also that Hizbullah is not highly responsive to rational calculations of the strategic balance or to the infliction of material damage. Certainly, destroying its military equipment and killing its troops can be most effective. But material damage inflicted even on its supporters is welcomed by Hizbullah as a means of mobilizing them and even making them financially dependent on an organization well-funded by Damascus and Teheran.

If, therefore, Israel is going to force a state actor to pay the price in order to give it an incentive to rein in Hizbullah, the proper address is Syria.

THERE IS another important factor here which suggests holding Syria, rather than Lebanon, to account. International diplomacy and public opinion has become an important force in shaping regional issues. This situation was central to the 2006 Israel-Hizbullah war, when there were tremendous demands and heavy pressures on Israel to stop operations in and against Lebanon. In the event of a Syrian-oriented response, however, such reaction and pressures would probably be much less. Unlike Lebanon, Syria would not be seen as an innocent victim able to muster sympathy. Attacks on Syrian government, military and even strategic facilities would be less likely to involve civilian casualties. And while Israel has something political to lose by alienating the Lebanese, there are no such considerations regarding Syria. Given the fact that peace with Syria is simply not a possibility - a fact that should be clear to anyone going beyond the most superficial level of solely English-language rhetoric from Damascus - there is nothing to lose on this front, either.

To rebuild Israeli deterrence requires a proper degree of credible threat against those inciting, planning, financing and equipping attacks on Israel. This should be directed against those forces that are both implacable enemies and that have to take material losses into account.

If deterrence must turn into implementation, the guns should be pointed in the right direction. Let the Syrian rulers tremble where now they swagger.

The writer is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, Interdisciplinary Center, and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest book is The Truth About Syria.

FT Editorial - Republicans start to call time on Iraq

2007-07-10T14:46:00.000+03:00

Published: July 9 2007 19:27 | Last updated: July 9 2007 19:27

It was only a matter of time before the growing hostility among US citizens to the war in Iraq wormed its way into Republican ranks. A matter, in fact, of election time.

Although it has long been clear that the Bush administration’s Iraq policy has been a disaster, it is not so much the realities on the ground that have percolated into Republican consciousness as the prospect of defeat at next year’s congressional as well as presidential polls.

The erosion of Republican unity falls short of bipartisan consensus in favour of US withdrawal. But it has accelerated enough for Iraq’s foreign minister to warn on Monday that a premature pull-out would lead to civil war, regional conflagration and a failed state.

Those are, of course, real risks. The problem is that Iraq is already so far down that road – and the real question is whether the continuing presence of US (and British) troops in the country is part of the problem or part of the solution.

The US invasion that promised Iraqis freedom has deprived them of their security, smashed their state and fragmented their country into a lawless archipelago ruled by militias, jihadis, ethnic cleansers, bandits and kidnappers.

The continuing US military presence shows no sign of being able to resolve this. The so-called “surge” of troop reinforcements, like everything else Washington has tried in Iraq, is far too little, much too late.

What the US occupation has done, however, is to infantilise Iraq’s public life, encouraging its leaders to believe they can infantilise Iraq’s public life,continue to play sectarian, winner-takes-all politics while American forces prevent a descent into total anarchy.

Would a US withdrawal bring Iraq’s politicians to their senses, forcing them to seek ways of living together and rebuilding their country and institutions? There is no guarantee of that. But the democratic process in the US does pretty much guarantee that the troops will be brought home. It is time to start preparing for that and to use it as leverage in Iraq and the region.

The US should make support for Iraq’s government and army conditional on real efforts to promote national reconciliation and to defeat the jihadis by building alliances, including with nationalist insurgents. The prospect of the US pulling back should also be used to concentrate the minds of Iraq’s neighbours, including Iran, in ways that emphasise the benefits of a stable Iraq in a more secure region.

Measured against this administration’s fantasies of transforming the Middle East, this is not much. But it is a lot more than Iraq is likely to get under present US policies.

Despite warnings, oil usage expected to increase

2007-07-10T14:24:00.001+03:00

By James Kanter

Monday, July 9, 2007

PARIS: Despite four years of high prices and increasingly dire warnings about climate change, a new report Monday predicted that world oil demand would rise faster than previously expected over the next five years while production slips, threatening a supply crunch.

"Demand is growing and as people become accustomed to higher prices they are starting to return to their previous trends of high consumption," said Lawrence Eagles, the head of oil markets analysis at the Paris-based International Energy Agency. "It's important that we have more investment and a greater emphasis on energy efficiency."

The pressures on fuel supplies are growing because booming Asian economies are using more fuel to power their prospering manufacturing industries and to supply growing numbers of automobiles amid a spurt in consumerism.

Rapid growth of the petrochemicals sector and low-cost airlines are other important factors lifting demand.

Supplies are being squeezed by a scarcity of modern oil refining facilities as well as sufficient staff to operate them. Supplies also are a concern because of deteriorating production of oil from countries outside the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, the price-setting cartel operated by the world's biggest producers.

The world "needs more than three million barrels per day of new oil each year to offset the falling production in the mature fields outside of OPEC," Eagles said.

Analysts said that behind the overall numbers were signs that the energy habits of the planet were moving in two distinct directions.

In developed countries, and in particular in the European Union, obligations agreed to by governments to conserve energy and use renewable sources of energy - both to reduce carbon dioxide emissions and to maintain energy security - are expected to ease pressure on oil supplies.

But that trend is being offset by rapidly developing nations. While they still consume far less energy per capita, they also are manufacturing goods for rich countries and increasingly are adopting heavily energy-consuming lifestyles, including air conditioners, refrigerators and cars.

"My view is that energy consciousness will figure strongly in Western countries and could contribute to demand decrease, but it's not at all sure that we will see the same trends in China and India," said Colette Lewiner, global leader for energy at Capgemini in Paris.

In its report, the International Energy Agency, which advises 26 industrialized countries, said that global oil demand would rise by an average 2.2 percent a year from 2007 to 2012, up from a forecast in February 2007 of 2 percent annually from 2006 to 2011.

Developing world and emerging industrialized economies will see their share of world oil consumption rise from 42 percent of global oil demand to 46 percent by 2012, the report said.

Eagles welcomed progress in Europe and Asia, where governments are mandating more efficient cars. He said that the "United States is very clearly coming to the point where there would be a landmark change in fuel efficiency policies."

He also welcomed ramped up investment in refining capacity across the world, saying that could help exert some downward pressure on prices over the next three years. But those effects are likely to be short-lived, Eagles said.

Beyond 2010, Eagles warned, "tightness in OPEC's spare capacity will reassert itself."

And by 2012, he said, there would either have to be limits on demand or additional supplies in order to avoid price increases.

Eagles also gave a stark warning that biofuels - a renewable source of energy produced from plants - were unlikely to be a quick, silver-bullet solution.

Factories to make biofuels are becoming commonplace but agricultural products that are the basis of the fuels are - like crude oil in some parts of the world - becoming scarcer.

Prices of this feedstock including corn, sugar, soybeans, wheat and palm oil have risen sharply, making the production of biofuels increasingly expensive.

"Although we have a lot of policy statements on biofuels in many countries, the policies and mandates aren't fully in place at this point so we are not sure that this supply is going to be there," Eagles said.

By 2012 biofuels will still only account for only 2 percent of global oil supplies, the International Energy Agency said.

Yet another factor weighing on fuel supplies is periodic but severe problems in supplies of cleaner-burning natural gas, which has supplanted fuel oil in many industries over the past quarter-century.

But natural catastrophes such as Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita in 2005, which knocked out U.S. gas production, and political decisions such as when Russia turned off gas supplies to neighboring countries in 2006, have led to renewed demand for fuel oil - putting yet more pressure on oil supplies.

The Changing Nature of War: Six New Challenges by Giora Eiland

2007-07-05T02:33:00.000+03:00

Jaffee Center Strategic Asessment Volume 10, No. 1 June 2007

http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/sa/10_1_04.html

Since World War II - and for Israel, since the Yom Kippur War - the nature of war has changed gradually but continuously, evolving from conventional total wars among states to low intensity military confrontations between states and organizations. This observation encompasses two dimensions: first, the number of low intensity wars is greater than the number of conventional total wars. Second, there are more wars between a state and organizations (terror organization, guerilla organization) than (symmetric) wars between states. This does not mean that the age of conventional wars is over, rather that the phenomenon of other kinds of confrontations has expanded significantly alongside regular wars.

States (led by either politicians or the military) generally fail to understand the significance of this change. Thus, even when the confrontation in question is different from a "regular" conventional war they continue to judge, appraise, and evaluate the situation in terms of criteria that are increasingly less relevant. The 2006 war in Lebanon and the war in Iraq proved this repeatedly. For example, around a year ago, the US president convened a press conference to explain that the security situation in Iraq was improving. In order to convey a sense of professionalism he appeared alongside General Casey, commander of the US forces in Iraq. Proof of the improvement offered by the president was the number of Iraqi battalions that were becoming operational - they were increasing in number, and the number would continue to grow. The president used a correct set of terms for regular wars in which the side that has more divisions has a better chance of victory. In a conventional war the balance of power is mainly measured by quantitative evaluation. In Iraq, the quantitative aspect to the confrontation is not entirely unimportant, but it is secondary compared with other variables, which the president did not mention.

Similar assessments are made in Israel. Before the war in Lebanon I was a member of a team that examined the defense budget. Most of the members argued that the budget could by cut by about $1 billion. The scientific explanation for this was offered by means of comparing Israel's investment in the defense budget with its enemies' investment. As Israel invests more, its investment is apparently superfluous, so cuts can be made and savings gleaned. The point is, though, that in an asymmetric war the cost of an explosives belt and preparation of a suicide bomber is insignificant compared with the sum that it takes to prevent an attack. Consequently, the quantitative terminology (comparing battalions or budgets) is almost entirely irrelevant.

The reality of a new kind of war generates six challenges, which are the focus of the essay below.

Challenge 1: Asymmetric Wars in a Populated Arena

Asymmetric wars that take place in an arena with a civilian population require an analysis and adjustment of the principal variables. The first adjustment is connected to intelligence. While in a conventional war the commander asks the operations officer where is the enemy, in an asymmetric war the first question asked is, who is the enemy. The enemy in an asymmetric war does not wear a uniform and is part of a civilian population, and thus it is not always clear who he is. Moreover, the enemy can be "both" - an ordinary civilian during the day and a terrorist at night. Yet the more important dimension in terms of "who the enemy is" is specifically not the tactical dimension, rather the political dimension. For example, in recent years the definition of "who is the enemy" in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has changed many times according to the political situation. At certain times the Palestinian security forces were allies "fighting with us against terror"; other times they stood to the side; and at other times they were "the enemy" that Israel faced.

The definition of the enemy was no less important in the Second Lebanon War. Israel decided the enemy was Hizbollah and not Lebanon, and the world delighted in this distinction. It supported every attack on Hizbollah targets and opposed any attack on other Lebanese targets. Yet it is difficult - if not impossible - to overcome a guerilla organization that enjoys the clear sponsorship of a state if it is impossible to attack the sponsoring state (Lebanon). Thus, Israel placed itself in a tough campaign with its hands tied behind its back, without even seriously examining the question of who is "the enemy."

The second component of intelligence relates to what constitutes a relevant target. If in regular wars a large part of the relevant intelligence concerned physical targets (tanks, headquarters, and airports) and was the output of a longer process, in an asymmetric confrontation real time intelligence is measured in hours, minutes, and sometimes seconds, and the vast majority of targets are people. If, for example, it is known that the enemy is located in a particular building, this building will be a target. If the terrorists move somewhere else five minutes later the building is no longer relevant as a target. Thus, a high capacity for intelligence adjustment in real time is required.

The fact that low intensity wars take place within civilian populations is not just an intelligence issue, and it has far-reaching aspects - from rules of management to legal aspects. The latter is related, for example, to the Supreme Court discussion of whether targeted killings are permissible.[1]

Challenge 2: Civil-Military Relations

In regular wars the dialogue is simple: the political leadership informs the army it has to win, and after a ceasefire is achieved, the political leadership starts to work. After the army conducts the fighting, the politicians address the results of the war. This is a simple set of concepts. It may be hard to achieve a victory, but the definition of what represents a victory is simple, since the political definitions are generally quite clear and their translation into military objectives is simple. Military tasks and achievements are formulated in basic terms: stop the advance of a division, seize a mountain range, prevent the enemy from crossing a certain line, or destroy an airport.

The conventional war between states is relatively simple, as it involves a clearly defined area relating to the dimension of time (the time the war starts and the time it ends) and the dimension of space, and there is a clear framework in terms of the parties involved. The state framework serves as "an address" and overall, there is an authorized mechanism to suspend or halt the confrontation when the state opts to do so.

Definitions blur when the enemy is an organization rather than a state. Then the delineations of time and place are less clear, and the state's objectives are more amorphous in terms of what it wishes to achieve and what it is capable of achieving. In limited confrontations it is not easy to define political objectives and to translate them into military missions. A British general with experience in Northern Ireland, Bosnia, and the 1991 Gulf War once said on a visit to Israel that in today's reality, the attempt to define the strategic purpose or the army's missions is like trying to hold jelly in your hand. The more you try to grasp it the more it slips through your fingers. For this reason one should strive to maintain a different type of dialogue between the political and military leaderships, not just a hierarchical dialogue in which the politicians command and the army implements, but something qualitatively different.

I witnessed the difficulty in generating the right kind of dialogue when Ehud Barak was prime minister. During Barak's term, at the start of the events of September-October 2000, every time a terrorist attack occurred that led to an escalation in the situation, the General Staff generals were summoned hurriedly to the office of the prime minister, who was also the minister of defense. The prime minister asked for the aerial photographs of the targets the army recommended attacking. His decision, as head of the political leadership, was to wage an aerial attack and the army's role in the discussion was to suggest targets. It took a while for one of us to say: "Mr. Prime Minister, maybe the principal issue here isn't which targets to attack. Maybe we should be asking whether attacking is the right thing to do. Maybe there are more effective measures we can take." There was a similar process with Sharon. It was actually Shimon Peres (who at the time was foreign minister) who said at one of the discussions that 80 percent of the important issues were neither just of a military nature nor just political, but involved both areas. He determined that there was no choice but to hold joint discussions, and with high frequency.

Three weeks after the start of the Second Lebanon War, Olmert said that the army did not present him with a ground operations plan in Lebanon, so he did not approve anything that was not presented to him. This claim reflects a basic misunderstanding regarding how the dialogue between the political and military leaderships should take place. In today's reality almost every political action has security implications; certainly every military action has political implications. Under such circumstances the prime minister cannot wait for the army to come to him and submit plans. In a situation such as the war in Lebanon the prime minister, chief of staff, and minister of defense should meet on a daily basis, in the most select forum, first to ascertain that all share the same view of the reality, and then to jointly make the right decisions.

Challenge 3: Organizational and Process Changes

The defense organizations were formed to suit either of two situations: a situation of complete security calm or an all-out war. Today, the continuum between all-out war on the one hand and total peace on the other generates innumerable other situations that necessitate a different type of division of authority and coordination between the parties involved. The United States reached this conclusion after September 11, 2001 and after the war in Iraq. The question that arose is whether the division of areas between military intelligence, the CIA, and the FBI, which was appropriate at the end of World War II and at the start the Cold War, is also the correct structure to deal with terror today. The conclusion was that the intelligence facility needed to be reorganized. A civilian team was appointed to oversee and coordinate between the various intelligence sections. This team reports to the president, so that the CIA head is no longer the senior of the three organization heads and no longer reports directly to the president. In Israel too changes are underway - some successful and others less so.

The division of tasks between the IDF and the police can be cited as an example. Until 1973 the IDF had to fight against the Syrian and Egyptian armed forces, and the police were responsible for catching criminals. The division between the tasks was so clear that during a war that lasted two to three weeks, police officers left their regular duties and joined the military, since the only important occupation during a war was to fight at the front. Today, when one examines the tasks of the police and the army, one finds an overlap of some 30 percent. This requires adjustments in some areas, such as allocating resources and personnel and granting authority. As one who served as IDF head of operations for ten years, I can attest to the army's conceptual difficulty in recognizing that on a national level, it was preferable that 13,000 police officers continue in their professional capacity and not join the army as reservists.

Another example of organizational complexity is the boundaries of responsibility between Military Intelligence, the Mossad, and the GSS. Officially the Mossad is responsible for preventing terror abroad and the GSS is in charge of terror inside Israel and the territories. Today this delineation is inadequate. Some of the major terror threats cross borders - a suicide terrorist can come from England or pass through Egypt to Gaza and from there to Israel. In this case, who is responsible?

A positive example of changes made in the defense system in view of the requirements of an asymmetric war concerns the challenge of suicide attacks, and this returns us to the issue of targeted killing. In order to act efficiently one needs not only to finalize intelligence within a matter of minutes but also "to close an operational cycle," in other words, to connect the information of the GSS officer with the commander of the area division and the fighter pilot. The GSS and air force should be allowed to coordinate an operation in a matter of minutes or seconds, at a level of uncertainty and great complexity. The prime minister is the party responsible for formally connecting the two organizations. Nevertheless, the IDF and the GSS have created efficient working processes by adjusting dividing lines, and this is the only way to achieve efficient operational results. Such changes are generally effected late, or are not carried out at all.

Challenge 4: Technology

Superficially, one can say that if one is waging a war against an enemy armed with explosives belts, knives, and Kalashnikov rifles, then advanced technologies are irrelevant because ultimately it comes down to hand to hand combat on the streets. This is obviously an error, as the state's clear advantage over an organization lies in the capabilities and resources at its disposal, particularly technological capabilities. Thus, technological adjustments are required to fighting against terrorist organizations, which involve not only technical ability (converting weapons currently used from use a to use b) but also the ability to change the psychological orientation of those developing the technology. For example, when a missile or bomb is manufactured for a war, the better it is, the greater its ability to kill and wreak destruction. When fighting in an arena with civilians, some of the weaponry becomes problematic. The weapons have to be made less lethal and then used effectively. If this expertise is not available one remains with advanced technology that is not compatible with the circumstances of asymmetric war.

A good example of matching new weaponry to new situations, particularly in the last six years, is the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). Initially UAVs were mainly designed for identifying clear military targets, such as tanks, artillery, and enemy headquarters. Due to technological advances in camera quality, flight duration, and altitude (UAVs are not visible or audible from the ground) one can employ them efficiently to combat terror. The UAV is used today not only to track down people (during the day and at night) but also to identify a specific person. A better example of this is the technological solution that allows listening to the enemy's communications equipment, and specifically its adaptation for use in the West Bank. It would not be an exaggeration to say that a crucial part of the success in dealing with suicide terrorism is due to the development of suitable technological abilities.

Challenge 5: Media

One of the important means in any military confrontation, including regular wars, is public legitimacy, particularly international legitimacy. The impact of this factor on freedom of action and the ability to prolong and maximize the means at one's disposal is enormous. International legitimacy is influenced by the image of the reality more than by the reality itself, and the image of the reality is largely created by the media - especially television. The IDF understands that this is the situation, but it is difficult to translate this basic understanding into actual measures, primarily when it incurs a price that the IDF is not always willing to pay.

At the start of the events of October 2000 the Jewish settlement of Netzarim, in the middle of the Gaza Strip, was surrounded and under siege. For about one week air lifts by helicopter were the only way of providing the settlement and the IDF battalion there with supplies. Every night a CH 53 helicopter was sent with soldiers and equipment to the settlement. At the time the foreign media was extremely hostile towards Israel and focused almost exclusively on the Palestinian side of events. I was then head of operations. The IDF spokesperson called me and said there were three foreign reporters who wanted to go to Netzarim to relate the Israeli side of the story. Clearly, the only way to do this was to fly them there by helicopter. I called Yair Naveh, then commander of the Gaza division, and asked him to take the reporters to Netzarim on a night trip. Naveh said to me: "Have you lost your mind? If I take them they will use the space otherwise available for a sniper, a MAG gunman, and a medic . . ."

The IDF's openness to the issue of the media has developed significantly since October 2000, but is still far from the desired level.

Challenge 6: Expectations vs. Reality

In asymmetric war there is a large discrepancy between expectations among public opinion, politicians, and the media and the capability of the security forces to realize those expectations. The gap between expectations and realistic capabilities is reflected in four ways: the duration of the campaign, the number of casualties, the ability to avoid wounding innocent people, and the ability to achieve complete victory. Expectations are as such:

· Duration of the campaign. If the IDF beat four armies in six days in 1967, how long should it need to gain victory over a few thousand Hizbollah fighters? We are stronger than the enemy, and as such, it is reasonable that we should win in a short period of time.

· The number of casualties. Armed confrontations like the one in Lebanon are not generally wars of survival. They are sometimes viewed as "elective wars" and therefore the price one is willing to pay is determined accordingly. The IDF is both stronger than the enemy and has the benefit of far more advanced equipment. These advantages generate the expectation that we will win without endangering our forces, based on the thinking that with such sophisticated weapons, we should engage the enemy from a distance and with caution.

· Avoid wounding innocent people. We are ready to support all-out war with Hamas or Hizbollah as long as the casualties on their side are fighters. When the television shows pictures of dead children, we tend to express reservations and protest, "we didn't support this kind of war."

· Manner of victory. We are ready to pay a price for war, and even for an elective war, on condition that we ultimately achieve a clear and total victory. A clear and total victory means formal surrender by the enemy and acceptance of our terms or, at least, inflicting such a severe blow on the enemy that it is clear to all, including the enemy, that it can no longer continue fighting.

These expectations are logical as long as "a regular situation assessment" is made, and as long as the balance of power is examined with the traditional measurements of states engaged in a conventional war. Some of today's wars, however, are different in terms of their character, and their special nature neutralizes part of Israel's advantages. Thus, it is impossible to attain the full desired result in any of the aforementioned dimensions.

Occasionally, a short term impression emerges that the desired result has been achieved (Iraq in April 2003 or Lebanon 1982). However, often this is the result of only one campaign and not of the entire war. After a while the enemy adjusts to the circumstances and embarks on a new campaign using tactics that neutralize the advantages of the modern army. If the military leadership or senior politicians ignore this and promise the public results that are unattainable, it will increase the gap between the expectations and the results, and a serious crisis of trust will ensue when the full reality emerges.

Strategic Adjustments

The ability to win a war in the twenty-first century depends on a leadership's ability to prepare for it correctly. The following are four anchoring guidelines:

· Suitable deployment for the nature of the impending war. There are three kinds of military confrontation: (1) conventional wars between states; (2) wars with states with which there is no shared border; (3) wars with terrorist or guerilla organizations. Each of these categories involves a different approach. The decision makers have to know what kind of war they will have to face and what its attributes are when a crisis develops or a war is initiated.

The use of aerial force to achieve the objectives (or most of them) is correct in a war with an enemy state with which there is no shared border. This is also the correct approach when engaging an enemy that bases most of its force on tanks and fixed facilities, and when the enemy - which is a state - is sensitive to damage inflicted on national infrastructures. That aerial force with the same technological abilities is less efficient when the enemy's strength is based on thousands of fighters with personal weapons (including rockets and anti-tank missiles), who are part of the civilian population and are not sensitive to national logic or damage to national infrastructures.

· Creating versatility and flexibility in the defense forces. Versatility in this context is a military ability that is suitable for a range of scenarios. The UAV is a good example. It is an efficient intelligence tool against distant countries, against a conventional army, and in a war against terror. Flexibility is the ability to change processes, inter-organizational areas of authority, and organizational structures, together with a change in the environment and the threats. Such a need was identified twenty years ago with regard to protection of the home front. Nevertheless, the Israeli government displayed rigid thinking and did not take the necessary measures, as evidenced by the severe problems with the home front during the Second Lebanon War.

· Use of military force while recognizing its limitations. What has changed in recent years is not just the nature of the military confrontations but also the way the world views violent confrontations that cause fatalities. In order to succeed in a war one has to achieve legitimacy for the strategy (the act of embarking on a war) and the tactics (the way the war is conducted and the means used). The former, on its own, is not sufficient. The "good news" is that these limitations also restrict the enemy, even if it is an organization and not a state (and on condition that it has a strong connection with the state, for example, Hamas or Hizbollah). The restrictions that these two organizations were forced to accept in the last six years show how much the combination of military force with other means - political, economic, and public - is the correct mode.

· Matching objectives to capabilities. It is not right to conclude from the aforementioned that one cannot achieve significant objectives in confrontations with terror or guerilla organizations. Israel's achievements in its fight against suicide terrorists from Gaza and the West Bank are highly impressive, and it would not be wrong to define it as a victory. In March 2002, 135 people in Israel were killed in seventeen terror attacks. Since then Israel's losses in such attacks have been significantly reduced. The dramatic change is the result of four elements: (1) a successful military operation in April 2002, which set the right attainable objectives; (2) continued control of West Bank towns; (3) the construction of the security fence; (4) long term pressure on Hamas, which impelled the organization to suspend suicide missions.

Thus, coherence of the objective, the tasks, and a realistic level of expectations (i.e., significant lowering of the level of terror, but not total cessation) were and are a key to success.

[1] The fact that a discussion of whether targeted killing is permissible or not attests in part to a misunderstanding of reality. The determining factor regarding whether or not an action taken against an enemy is labeled targeted killing is only the nature of the intelligence. For example: a military force is operating next to the security fence in the Gaza Strip and terrorists open fire on it. If the Israeli force returns fire everyone would agree this is an act of self defense (and thus legitimate). Change just one element: assume that the force receives information about the whereabouts of the terrorists one minute in advance. Based on real time intelligence, Israeli forces open fire. Does this become targeted killing, since Israel opened fire? Probably not. Now assume that there is better intelligence and the information about the terrorists arrives while they are still in a vehicle en route to the ambush. This kind of good, real time intelligence allows one to send a gunship helicopter to attack the terrorists while they are on their way. Does the operation then become non-legitimate? If the enemy is considered a target that can legitimately be hit (and this is a question that should be asked in any event, and especially when its identity is known) then it is unreasonable to reject the targeted killing only because there was good intelligence, which reduced the risk and increased the chances of success.

Hayden's Hands-On Style Changes Tone at CIA

2006-12-28T13:35:00.000+02:00

Director Seeks to Improve Flow of Information, Restore Agency's Sense of Confidence and Mission

By Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writer
Thursday, December 28, 2006; A14

On Mondays at 8:30 a.m., the top 20 CIA staff members gather in the Operations Center on the seventh floor of the agency's headquarters in Langley. The pace is quick -- no one even sits down -- as the staffers tell their director, Gen. Michael V. Hayden, what to expect in their areas of expertise over the next 48 hours.

The meeting highlights the sharp change in tone at the agency since Hayden took over from his predecessor, Porter J. Goss. A former congressman, Goss was not used to dealing with a large staff of senior managers; instead, he worked primarily through a handful of personal aides, most of whom he brought from Capitol Hill.

Goss did not personally run the early-morning staff meeting, leaving that to his executive director. He held his own once-a-week meeting on Wednesdays, later in the morning, according to one participant.

Hayden is more hands-on and is working to improve the flow of information through the agency. His task is complex -- to prevent the kind of intelligence failures highlighted by the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the faulty information about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, while restoring a sense of confidence and mission within the CIA.

As a result of post-Sept. 11 legislation creating a director of national intelligence, the CIA director is free from responsibility for other government intelligence operations and is able to focus on the agency. Hayden also has the added duty of overseeing all human intelligence gathered abroad.

He recently sat for an interview in his office, along with his top three deputies. While the officials declined to talk about the specifics of their jobs, they outlined the practices Hayden is using to make his mark on the agency.

"The Monday meeting is in our Ops Center, just to kind of give the week the right flavor, a stand-up meeting . . . designed to be short and move on," Hayden said. Sometimes the session lasts just three or four minutes. Those attending meet to find out from the operations duty officer what transpired overnight and then to hear from others around the room.

One recent morning, with Hayden called to a meeting downtown, Deputy Director Stephen R. Kappes ran it. The senior duty officer opened with an update on developments in Iraq and some items on jihad Web sites. As Kappes subsequently went around the room, there was little beyond the ordinary. "The rest was just quick and uneventful," said one participant.

John E. McLaughlin -- who served as deputy director under Goss and Goss's predecessor, George J. Tenet -- said he and Tenet regarded the 8:30 staff meeting as a way for top officials "to put on the table whatever they wanted." After a lapse under Goss, "it looks like they're getting back to business" under Hayden and Kappes, McLaughlin said.

Hayden has actually cut back on the number of set meetings at the CIA but holds impromptu gatherings as needed. "We're trying to take much more of a 'no nonsense' approach," Kappes said.

Hayden gets an early start each day, when he is picked up from his Bolling Air Force Base house at 6:45 a.m. He reads the President's Daily Brief (PDB) in the car, with his own briefer there to answer questions or expand on the contents. By the time he gets to the Langley headquarters building and reads other incoming cables, it's about 8 a.m.

"I get to work as director of the Central Intelligence Agency as John Negroponte is waiting to go into the Oval Office" to brief President Bush, Hayden said. Before the 2004 intelligence reorganization, that would have been Hayden's job. Now, Hayden said, he attends the Oval Office morning briefing about once a week with Negroponte, the director of national intelligence. "I'm there representing the CIA, talking about activities beyond the intelligence analysis inside the PDB."

Although Negroponte's office controls what goes into the PDB and contributions come from all parts of the intelligence community, the CIA's analytic staff still writes a major part of it and handles the editing and production of the report. "The DNI himself still has final say as to whether an item goes or doesn't go," said Larry Pfeiffer, Hayden's chief of staff.

Around 9:15 a.m., the White House and other PDB briefers from the CIA -- one each for the secretaries of state, defense and homeland security -- return to Langley and give feedback to Hayden, Kappes and others based on what Bush, Vice President Cheney, national security adviser Stephen J. Hadley and Cabinet members said that morning. Those questions and requests turn into tasks for the agency.

Hayden handles a number of ceremonial duties, which he described as "some things on campus that only a director can do," referring to the headquarters area, and "probably a fair amount of the time representing the CIA outside the agency."

These include National Security Council meetings that take up specific major issues and the principals' meetings of top administration officials, also at the White House but chaired by Hadley. For these, a team of CIA officers and analysts are brought in beforehand to brief either Hayden or Kappes.

There are weekly program-manager meetings with Negroponte or his principal deputy held on Monday afternoons, regular lunches with Negroponte and the defense secretary, periodic lunches with FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III, regular meetings with Negroponte, and, in most weeks, a meeting with Hadley and Negroponte in which they are often joined by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff.

With Hadley, the subjects are often operations issues that may require presidential involvement. With Negroponte, they generally concern approval of overall strategy. "Briefing concepts, but normally not approval of that particular thing or this particular thing . . . not down to the fine print," Hayden said. Covert action programs have to go through a traditional process of reviews run by the NSC, "and depending on who is meeting, one of us is there," he said.

One of Kappes's duties is to be, as he put it, "transferable for the director . . . so I can go in any direction when I leave the house, depending on needs." He and Hayden share some meetings and divvy up others.

On Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays at 4:30 p.m., there is an operational meeting that includes the chiefs of the clandestine service and the CIA's counterterrorism center, along with the representatives of other agencies, such as the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Pentagon's Joint Special Operations Command, the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security. It is the successor to the daily 5 p.m. meeting that Tenet initiated after the Sept. 11 attacks to coordinate anti-terrorism intelligence and operations.

Last Friday, at the 4:30 meeting, Hayden said he went first and "laid out two or three taskings that did come about as a result of the events and conversations of the day." Issues taken up go beyond counterterrorism, but that is normally the main topic on Mondays and Wednesdays and at specially called meetings in between when actions have to be taken immediately.

Though neither Hayden nor Kappes would detail a typical day, McLaughlin, referring back to his time running the agency, gave what he said was a hypothetical example. Each morning began when he was given a scheduling card, filled in on both sides, that laid out his day in 30-minute chunks.

"You would go from meeting some foreign intelligence chief to a discussion on counterintelligence with the FBI," he said. "Then on to the White House to brief on Indonesia or Brazil, then back to headquarters for some guy who's retiring, then for a meeting with a delegation from some other agency that's angry about something we had done."

For a CIA director, he said, "there are a number of decisions where there are no good choices, between the levels of risk and the knowledge that under the best of circumstances things can go wrong. . . . It is the most fascinating job in Washington where, today, intelligence is central to everything that is being done."

NYT - Our Corner of Iraq By PETER W. GALBRAITH

2006-07-25T14:07:00.000+03:00

WHAT is the mission of the United States military in Iraq now that the insurgency has escalated into a full-blown civil war? According to the Bush administration, it is to support a national unity government that includes all Iraq’s major communities: the Shiites, Sunni Arabs and Kurds. O.K., but this raises another question: What does the Iraqi government govern?

In the southern half of Iraq, Shiite religious parties and clerics have created theocracies policed by militias that number well over 100,000 men. In Basra, three religious parties control — and sometimes fight over — the thousands of barrels of oil diverted each day from legal exports into smuggling. To the extent that the central government has authority in the south, it is because some of the same Shiite parties that dominate the government also control the south.

Kurdistan in the north is effectively independent. The Iraqi Army is barred from the region, the Iraqi flag prohibited, and central government ministries are not present. The Kurdish people voted nearly unanimously for independence in an informal referendum in January 2005.

And in the Sunni center of the nation and Baghdad, the government has virtually no control beyond the American-protected Green Zone. The Mahdi Army, a radical Shiite militia, controls the capital’s Shiite neighborhoods, while Qaeda offshoots and former Baathists are increasingly taking over the Sunni districts.

While the Bush administration professes a commitment to Iraq’s unity, it has no intention of undertaking the major effort required to put the country together again. During the formal occupation of Iraq in 2003 and 2004, the American-led coalition allowed Shiite militias to mushroom and clerics to impose Islamic rule in the south, in some places with a severity reminiscent of Afghanistan’s Taliban.

To disarm militias and dismantle undemocratic local governments now would bring the United States into direct conflict with Iraq’s Shiites, who are nearly three times as numerous as the Sunni Arabs and possess vastly more powerful militias and military forces.

There are no significant coalition troops in Kurdistan, which is secure and increasingly prosperous. Arab Iraqis have largely accepted Kurdistan’s de facto separation from Iraq, and so has the Bush administration.

In the Sunni center, our current strategy involves handing off combat duties to the Iraqi Army. Mostly, it is Shiite battalions that fight in the Sunni Arab areas, as the Sunni units are not reliable. Thus what the Bush administration portrays as “Iraqi” security forces is seen by the local Sunni population as a hostile force loyal to a Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad, installed by the American invaders and closely aligned with the traditional enemy, Iran. The more we “Iraqize” the fight in the Sunni heartland, the more we strengthen the insurgents.

Because it is Iraq’s most mixed city, Baghdad is the front line of Iraq’s Sunni-Shiite civil war. It is a tragedy for its people, most of whom do not share the sectarian hatred behind the killing. Iraqi forces cannot end the civil war because many of them are partisans of one side, and none are trusted by both communities.

For the United States to contain the civil war, we would have to deploy more troops and accept a casualty rate many times the current level as our forces changed their mission from a support role to intensive police duties. The American people would not support such an expanded mission, and the Bush administration has no desire to undertake it.

The administration, then, must match its goals in Iraq to the resources it is prepared to deploy. Since it cannot unify Iraq or stop the civil war, it should work with the regions that have emerged. Where no purpose is served by a continuing military presence — in the Shiite south and in Baghdad — America and its allies should withdraw.

As an alternative to using Shiite and American troops to fight the insurgency in Iraq’s Sunni center, the administration should encourage the formation of several provinces into a Sunni Arab region with its own army, as allowed by Iraq’s Constitution. Then the Pentagon should pull its troops from this Sunni territory and allow the new leaders to establish their authority without being seen as collaborators.

Seeing as we cannot maintain the peace in Iraq, we have but one overriding interest there today — to keep Al Qaeda from creating a base from which it can plot attacks on the United States. Thus we need to have troops nearby prepared to re-engage in case the Sunni Arabs prove unable to provide for their own security against the foreign jihadists.

This would be best accomplished by placing a small “over the horizon” force in Kurdistan. Iraqi Kurdistan is among the most pro-American societies in the world and its government would welcome our military presence, not the least because it would help protect Kurds from Arab Iraqis who resent their close cooperation with the United States during the 2003 war. American soldiers on the ground might also ease the escalating tension between the Iraqi Kurds and Turkey, which is threatening to send its troops across the border in search of Turkish Kurd terrorists using Iraq as a haven.

From Kurdistan, the American military could readily move back into any Sunni Arab area where Al Qaeda or its allies established a presence. The Kurdish peshmerga, Iraq’s only reliable indigenous military force, would gladly assist their American allies with intelligence and in combat. And by shifting troops to what is still nominally Iraqi territory, the Bush administration would be able to claim it had not “cut and run” and would also avoid the political complications — in United States and in Iraq — that would arise if it were to withdraw totally and then have to send American troops back into Iraq.

Yes, a United States withdrawal from the Shiite and Sunni Arab regions of Iraq would leave behind sectarian conflict and militia rule. But staying with the current force and mission will produce the same result. Continuing a military strategy where the ends far exceed the means is a formula for war without end.

Peter W. Galbraith, a former United States ambassador to Croatia, is the author of “The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created a War Without End.”

WaPo - Six Powers Reach Accord On Iran Plan

2006-06-02T14:39:00.000+03:00

Six Powers Reach Accord On Iran Plan
U.S. Supports Combination Of Incentives, 'Disincentives'

By Glenn Kessler
Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, June 2, 2006; A01

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/01/AR2006060100363.html

VIENNA, June 1 -- The United States and five other major world powers agreed Thursday to offer Iran a broad new collection of rewards if it halts its drive to master nuclear technology, but they threatened "further steps in the Security Council" if Iran refuses.

The agreement, announced here by British Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett following extended talks, brings general unity to the countries' approach to Iran after months of discord, diplomats said. It is intended to sharpen the choice facing Iran, giving it a clear reason to opt for cooperation over confrontation on its nuclear program.

"There are two paths ahead," Beckett told reporters, as Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and counterparts from Russia, China, France, Germany and the European Union stood at her side. "We urge Iran to take the positive path and to consider seriously our substantive proposals, which would bring significant benefits."

Beckett made the announcement near midnight Tehran time. There was no immediate response from the Iranian government.

Rice, who spent more than eight hours in sometimes freewheeling talks with her counterparts Thursday, flew here after announcing a major shift in U.S. policy on Wednesday -- a willingness to join the negotiations with Iran that have been led, unsuccessfully, by Britain, France and Germany, provided Iran suspends its uranium-enrichment activities first.

Iranian diplomats on Thursday did not reject outright the U.S. proposal for talks, but they criticized the demand that their country end enrichment first.

Although details of the five- to six-page document agreed to in Vienna were not announced, incentives discussed before the meeting included an international effort to assist Iran's nuclear industry, including construction of a light-water reactor and guarantees of a long-term supply of fuel. That would represent a significant shift from the Bush administration's past insistence that Iran has no need for nuclear power. Increased trade and investment have also been discussed.

Aides to Rice said the deal also commits China and Russia to a long list of specific steps to punish Iran if it refuses to halt its enrichment program. Both countries have resisted sanctions for months, arguing that they could backfire.

Addressing reporters here, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov emphasized the incentives in the package and did not mention possible negative measures. He said it was important that all six powers be united in making the offer, including the United States, which he said found it difficult to offer inducements to Iran.

The possible sanctions in the agreement are listed as a menu, ranging from minor to major, diplomats said. It was unclear whether there was agreement on which options to choose if Iran fails to act.

Diplomats have said that measures under discussion include an embargo on export of goods and technologies relevant to nuclear programs, the freezing of assets of organizations and people involved in the programs, and a suspension of technical cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Broader measures include a freeze on bilateral contacts, a visa and travel ban for senior Iranian officials, an arms embargo, an embargo on certain exports and an end to support for Iran's bid to join the World Trade Organization.

The Bush administration has repeatedly declared it "unacceptable" to have Iran armed with nuclear weapons. While publicly declaring that no option was "off the table," an allusion to military action, it had been struggling to organize unified diplomatic pressure against the country by all five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council.

Beckett read the brief statement after the diplomats huddled over it for two hours, fiddling with the wording. It emphasized the positive, while using vague code words for tough action, which U.S. officials said stemmed from a desire to persuade Iran to return to negotiations. Even speaking anonymously, U.S. officials repeatedly refused to characterize the possible punishments for Iran as "sanctions," using words such as "steps," "measures," "actions" and "negative disincentives."

"We are prepared to resume negotiations should Iran resume suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, as required by the IAEA, and we would also suspend action in the Security Council," Beckett said.

Representatives of some of the countries involved -- but not the United States -- will present the package to Iran in the "coming days," and an answer is expected before the Group of Eight industrialized countries meet in St. Petersburg in mid-July, a U.S. official told reporters. He said the countries had agreed not to disclose details until after Iran had received a full presentation and been allowed time to "digest it."

Germany's foreign minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, said Russia and China were considering joining the United States and the Europeans in the talks with Iran.

Iran offered a mixed initial reply earlier Thursday to the Bush administration's offer to join talks on the country's nuclear program: It welcomed the opportunity to deflect confrontation while resisting demands that it suspend work on the program first.

"We believe that under the current circumstances, negotiations without any precondition would be the best solution to put an end to the Tehran-Washington logjam," said Hamid Reza Asefi, spokesman for Iran's Foreign Ministry, in an interview with the official press agency IRNA.

Iran's foreign minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, reiterated the proviso, telling reporters, "We won't negotiate about the Iranian nation's natural nuclear rights but are prepared, within a defined, just framework and without any discrimination, to hold dialogue about common concerns."

Analysts and diplomats described the responses as preliminary. The most powerful elements of Iran's theocratic government remained silent on the U.S. proposal and were said to be intensely engaged in the private consultations that precede major policy announcements in Tehran.

The measured tenor of the Iranian diplomats' initial replies appeared to signal that their country was at least not dismissing the start of a process it had actively solicited in recent weeks, through back-channel messages seeking direct engagement with Washington. But one analyst in regular contact with the Tehran government said the full response would reflect skepticism about Bush's sincerity.

"The perception here is basically that the U.S. did what it did in response to domestic pressure inside the U.S., and also to convince the Russians and Chinese" to back stronger pressure on Iran, said Nasser Hadian-Jazy, a political scientist at Tehran University.

He predicted Iran's final response would stop short of obliging the Americans but go far enough to convince Moscow or Beijing of its good intentions. It might include steps such as suspending the installation of the next two enrichment systems and letting U.N. inspectors conduct snap inspections for the duration of the negotiations.

Correspondent Karl Vick in Tehran contributed to this report.

Thomas X. Hammes - Tearing Iraq Apart - NYT

2006-06-01T11:28:00.000+03:00

June 1, 2006

Op-Ed Contributor

Tearing Iraq Apart

By THOMAS X. HAMMES

Oxford, England

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/01/opinion/01hammes.html?_r=1&oref=slogin

THE White House is right to insist that our postwar goal is a unified Iraq, as opposed to one divided along ethno-religious lines. So why is the administration taking so many actions that make holding the country together virtually impossible?

In January, President Bush diverted nearly half the money allocated to reconstruction in Iraq to other needs, including security. Given that our current strategy is nicknamed "Clear-Hold-Build," where does that leave us? Clear-Hold-Hope? Mr. Bush's decision sent a terrible signal to the Iraqis about our resolve. It is even less understandable since the expense of the critical reconstruction program is a small fraction of our annual cost in Iraq.

Next, the administration deeply cut financing for democratization efforts, many of them undertaken by nongovernmental groups. The proposed budget for fiscal 2007 asks for a paltry $63 million. This token sum — in a war that costs some $200 million a day — may simply reflect a belief that the security situation prevents such efforts from being effective. But democratization has always been one of the administration's cherished goals, and cutting spending there sends the wrong message.

The latest administration budget also recommends cutting overall Army and Marine troop strength. If Mr. Bush and his advisers are really committed to sustained support for the "long war" in Iraq, how do they reconcile that with cutting the budgets for the most engaged forces?

President Bush and his aides have also repeatedly hinted at significant troop reductions in Iraq this year — perhaps to as low as 100,000 from the current 130,000. This is despite the growing violence in Baghdad and the fact that our military leaders in Iraq have consistently said that we can withdraw troops safely only if conditions improve. The administration may simply be talking fewer troops to reassure the electorate before midterms. Unfortunately, American voters are not the only audience. What do the Iraqis think?

The administration has long stated that the so-called Provincial Reconstruction Teams — groups of 100 or so political, economic, legal and civil-military relations specialists who help distribute aid and advise regional Iraqi officials, which have had success in Afghanistan — are critical to our strategy in Iraq. Yet The Washington Post reported in mid-April that only 4 of the proposed 16 teams had even been inaugurated.

In addition, the Army staffs and units in Iraq, even those training Iraqi security forces, continue to be undermanned. Meanwhile, former colleagues outside the war zone — in the Joint Forces Command, the European Command and the Pacific Command — tell me their commands remain at full strength. It seems the Pentagon does not consider the Iraq war important enough to shift from its peacetime manning models.

Last, the administration has repeatedly said efficient and law-abiding Iraqi security forces are central to our strategy, yet has failed to provide them with more than minimal equipment. Three years after the fall of Saddam Hussein, most Iraq troops are still using open-backed trucks and unarmored S.U.V.'s.

Let's face it: this laundry list of inaction on the part of the Bush administration leaves a prudent Iraqi with no practical choice but to prepare for a United States withdrawal long before the Iraqi central government and security forces are capable of running the nation. For most Iraqis — Arab or Kurd, Sunni or Shiite — this will mean looking to religious and ethnic militias, criminal gangs and Islamist insurgents for protection. This, in turn, greatly increases the chance of civil war.

The militias are already looking ahead: some are carving out safe areas they will use as bases in the coming war by driving Iraqis of other ethnic and religious groups out of mixed neighborhoods and villages. Iraqi government officials estimated that more than 100,000 families have already fled their homes. This falling back on militias and preparing for internecine conflict is not a new phenomenon. It is exactly what we saw in Afghanistan nearly two decades ago. Once the Afghans believed the Soviet troops were finally pulling out, the various insurgent groups stopped fighting the invaders and began positioning for a multisided civil war. That conflict, of course, lasted until the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001.

The Bush administration, despite all its missteps since the fall of the Baathists, has clung to one correct idea: that an intact Iraq is a better outcome than a splintered one. To keep it unified, however, the White House must commit to long timelines and to providing the money necessary for both the military and reconstruction efforts. The alternative is for Mr. Bush to change his mind and tell the American and Iraqi people that we must start planning for a peaceful division.

In any case, the uncertainty resulting from trying to have it both ways will result in the worst possible outcome: open civil war.

Thomas X. Hammes, a retired Marine colonel, is the author of "The Sling and the Stone: On Warfare in the 21st Century."

NYT News Analysis: Bush's Realization on Iran: No Good Choice Left Except Talks

2006-06-01T11:06:00.000+03:00

June 1, 2006

News Analysis

Bush's Realization on Iran: No Good Choice Left Except Talks

By DAVID E. SANGER

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/01/world/middleeast/01iran.html?hp&ex=1149220800&en=268899d875002e8b&ei=5094&partner=homepage

WASHINGTON, May 31 — After 27 years in which the United States has refused substantive talks with Iran, President Bush reversed course on Wednesday because it was made clear to him — by his allies, by the Russians, by the Chinese, and eventually by some of his advisers — that he no longer had a choice.

During the past month, according to European officials and some current and former members of the Bush administration, it became obvious to Mr. Bush that he could not hope to hold together a fractious coalition of nations to enforce sanctions — or consider military strikes on Iranian nuclear sites — unless he first showed a willingness to engage Iran's leadership directly over its nuclear program and exhaust every nonmilitary option.

Few of his aides expect that Iran's leaders will meet Mr. Bush's main condition: that Iran first re-suspend all of its nuclear activities, including shutting down every centrifuge that could add to its small stockpile of enriched uranium. Administration officials characterized their offer as a test of whether the Iranians want engagement with the West more than they want the option to build a nuclear bomb some day.

And while the Europeans and the Japanese said they were elated by Mr. Bush's turnaround, some participants in the drawn-out nuclear drama questioned whether this was an offer intended to fail, devised to show the extent of Iran's intransigence.

Either way, after five years of behind-the-scenes battling within the administration, Mr. Bush finally came to a crossroads at which both sides in the debate over Iran — engagers and isolaters, and some with a foot in each camp — saw an advantage in, as one senior aide said, "seeing if they are serious."

Mr. Bush, according to one participant in those debates, told Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice several months ago that he needed "a third option," a way to get beyond either a nuclear Iran or an American military action.

Ms. Rice spent a long weekend in early May drafting a proposal that included a timetable for diplomatic choreography through the summer.

"Nobody wants to get to that kind of crisis situation — whether it is us or the next administration — where you either accept an Iranian weapon or you are forced to do something drastic," said the participant, who declined to speak on the record about internal White House deliberations.

The idea of engagement is hardly new. When Colin L. Powell was secretary of state, several members of his senior staff argued vociferously that the United States needed to test Iran's willingness to deal with the United States — especially in the aftermath of Sept. 11.

There was strong opposition from the White House, particularly from Vice President Dick Cheney, according to several former officials.

"Cheney was dead set against it," said one former official who sat in many of those meetings. "At its heart, this was an argument about whether you could isolate the Iranians enough to force some kind of regime change." But three officials who were involved in the most recent iteration of that debate said Mr. Cheney and others stepped aside — perhaps because they read Mr. Bush's body language, or perhaps because they believed Iran would scuttle the effort by insisting that the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty gives it the right to develop nuclear fuel. The United States insists that Iran gave up that right by deceiving inspectors for 18 years.

In the end, said one former official who has kept close tabs on the debate, "it came down to convincing Cheney and others that if we are going to confront Iran, we first have to check off the box" of trying talks.

Mr. Bush offered a more positive-sounding account: "I thought it was important for the United States to take the lead, along with our partners, and that's what you're seeing. You're seeing robust diplomacy."

As part of the diplomatic timetable, Ms. Rice will be in Vienna on Thursday to endorse an international offer to Iran that includes several plums. Among them will be the dialogue with Washington that Iran has periodically sought, a lifting of many long-standing economic sanctions, and even light water reactors for nuclear power with Russia and the West controlling access to the fuel.

Yet skepticism abounds. "It's true that the conditions are significantly different than they were four or five years ago, but candidly they are not as favorable now for the United States," said Richard Haass, who as the head of the State Department's policy planning operation during Mr. Bush's first term was a major advocate of engagement with Iran.

First, the new president, Mahmoud Ahmadinijad, "has vowed that the country will never back down on enriching uranium.

"Oil's at $70 a barrel instead of $20, said Mr. Haass, now the president of the Council on Foreign Relations. "And we are bogged down in Iraq," where the United States is vulnerable to Iranian efforts to worsen the violence and arm the insurgents.

But the internal debates in the White House included vigorous discussion of the risks associated with any effort to negotiate with foes suspected of seeking nuclear weapons. And in this, Mr. Bush already has bitter experience.

In its dealings with North Korea, which Mr. Bush branded a member of the "axis of evil" along with Iran and Iraq, the administration also decided a few years ago to try limited engagement, locked arm-in-arm with neighboring nations.

But North Korea has kept making weapons fuel, and the allies have not stayed united: China and South Korea continue to aid the North. The Iranians have doubtless noticed.

The question now is whether there is any middle ground between Mr. Bush's demand that Iran give up everything, and Iran's insistence that it will give up nothing. Without breaking that logjam, the American-Iranian dialogue may never begin.

NYT Rice Proposes Path to Talks With Iran on Nuclear Issue

2006-06-01T06:47:00.000+03:00

May 31, 2006

Rice Proposes Path to Talks With Iran on Nuclear Issue

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/31/world/middleeast/31cnd-iran.html?hp&ex=1149134400&en=0de1407f10c4ed5b&ei=5094&partner=homepage

By STEVEN R. WEISMAN and JOHN O'NEIL

WASHINGTON, May 31 _ — Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said today that the United States would be willing to change course and join multinational talks with Iran over its nuclear program if it suspends all nuclear activities.

Ms. Rice said that the move was meant to "give new energy" to a European effort to develop a package of incentives or potential punishments to convince Iran to pull back from a nuclear program that it insists as peaceful but which the United States has argued is a cover for developing nuclear weapons.

Speaking at the State Department before flying to Vienna for a meeting with European diplomats, Ms. Rice said that the precondition for the multinational talks were for Iran to halt the uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities that it resumed following the election of President Mahmoud Ahmadenijad last year.

Tehran would also have to allow a resumption of the voluntary surprise visits by nuclear inspectors that it cut off earlier this year.

Ms. Rice held out the eventual prospect of a "new relationship" involving contacts in trade, sports and education. But she stressed that the talks would not involve one-on-one meetings with Iran and was not part any broader negotiations. The United States has not had full diplomatic ties with Iran since the 1979 hostage crisis.

"This is not a grand bargain," she said. "What we're talking about here is an effort to enhance the chances for a successful negotiated solution."

Before any broader talks could take place, Ms. Rice said, Iran would have to change policies that Ms. Rice involved the support of terrorism in the Palestinian territories and actions undermining the stability of Iraq.

She said the United States offer could be seen as removing "the last excuse" Iran would have for not taking a European offer seriously. And she made clear that the United States was keeping a firm grasp on the prospect of a stick to balance out the new carrot.

If the talks did not lead to agreement, Ms. Rice said, the United States would then move to "increase the pressure" through Security Council sanctions, "or if necessary, with like-minded states outside of the Security Council."

In Washington, the White House spokesman, Tony Snow, told reporters that President Bush had called the leaders of Russia, France and Germany on Tuesday to brief them on the decision, "and they all signed off."

"There are going to be some changes," Mr. Snow said of the United States position.

The United States has not had direct contacts with Iran since the 1979 hostage crisis, and Mr. Snow stressed today that the new round would not involve one-on-one discussions. "That's not part of the deal," he said.

Mr. Snow said the initiative did not amount to a new approach. He said it was "a way of making what we're doing more robust."

Pressure has been building on the administration to accept some sort of contact, as American and Europeans have struggled in recent weeks to find an approach that would win agreement from Russia and China, which are wary of imposing sanctions. European officials have said that Iran is more likely to be persuaded by any security guarantees included in the package if the United States is involved in the negotiations.

When President Ahmadinejad sent President Bush a rambling and highly critical letter earlier this month, administration officials dismissed it as not worthy of a response. But American diplomats suggested last week that they giving the question of talks of some sort of serious consideration.

In another move to enlist Russian support for a Security Council resolution, the Bush administration has agreed to language ruling out the immediate threat of military force, American and European officials said Tuesday.

The American agreement has improved the chances that the Russians will go along with the resolution, European diplomats said.

The American goal is to get an agreement on a Security Council resolution this week, for possible approval in June.

Also being negotiated are a package of benefits in nuclear energy, economic activities and security to be offered Iran if it cooperates in ending its nuclear activities. The Europeans are to offer this package with American support, but the Bush administration has quietly expressed misgivings about some of its possible elements.

"I think that we could safely say at this point that we feel like we're in good shape heading into Vienna," Sean McCormack, the State Department spokesman, said at a department briefing on Tuesday.

He added that Ms. Rice's top aide on the issue, R. Nicholas Burns, the undersecretary of state for political affairs, had worked with his counterparts over the weekend on various disagreements. "That list of open issues is being whittled down, being narrowed," Mr. McCormack said.

For months the United States has demanded that pressure on Iran must increase through passage of a Security Council resolution under Chapter VII of the United Nations charter. This chapter invokes the Council's power to demand compliance of member countries on certain matters and threaten punishment if they refuse.

Russia, fearing a replay of the events before the Iraq war in 2002 and 2003, has opposed any invocation of Chapter VII, on the ground that the United States might seize upon its approval as a justification for acting unilaterally to impose economic penalties or use military force against Iran.

To placate the Russians, the United States has agreed to invoke only Article 41 of Chapter VII, and not the whole chapter. Article 41 makes no reference to the possible use of force, and therefore offers the Russians a means to support it.

"We're splitting hairs, but it keeps the process going," said a United Nations diplomat familiar with the negotiations, speaking anonymously because he was not authorized to discuss the talks.

European diplomats said they were not sure whether Russia would show up in Vienna with a commitment to vote yes or to abstain from voting on the Security Council resolution. But two diplomats said it appeared that Russia did not like being seen as isolated by the United States and Europe on the matter.

In addition, they said, Mr. Putin hopes to get the issue of a Security Council resolution resolved soon so that it does not spill into the meetings of the Group of 8 nations in Moscow in June and in St. Petersburg in July.

Russia is the current president of the Group of 8, a rotating position, and is hoping for successful summit talks in St. Petersburg with President Bush and other top world leaders.

Steven R. Weisman reported from Washington for this article and John O'Neil from New York. Sheryl Gay Stolberg contributed reporting from Washington.

Barry Lynn - Globalisation must be saved from the radical global utopians - FT

2006-05-31T00:48:00.000+03:00

Globalisation must be saved from the radical global utopians
>Published: May 30 2006 03:00 | Last updated: May 30 2006 03:00
http://news.ft.com/cms/s/01726816-ef79-11da-b435-0000779e2340.html

Now may hardly seem the time to imagine a more global future, let alone do so with optimism. Most of us are hard pressed just to maintain the illusion that the present system is not breaking down, to deny with conviction what everyone knows - that the grand trade liberalisation project is, at best, on life support.

It is only natural to think conservatively, even defensively, when witnessing the collapse of an empire. Few outside the US doubt that America's free-trade system, constructed with such care in the decades after the war, is crumbling fast. The proximate cause is America's looming bankruptcy. As the ongoing Doha round of world trade negotiations has already proved, the US simply lacks the currency - in the form of believable promises of sustainable access to the US marketplace - to "buy" the next round of trade liberalisation, as Washington has "bought" every round since the 1960s. Clearly no other nation is willing or able to take America's place.

Yet we will find no better moment to begin, once again, to imagine a world in which expanding trade helps to promote a more just, secure, free and peaceful world. This is because there is no better time than today to face up to the two fatal flaws of the radical globalisation project that in the early 1990s came to supplant the more careful trade liberalisation of the postwar era: first, America's utopian belief that an unregulated "market" would somehow do the work of government; and second, the rise of global companies - especially in the retail and electronics sectors - to fill the power vacuum created by the retreat of the American state from its traditional role managing US trading relationships.

Similarly, there is no better time than now to grasp that the real question is not, as Americans like to frame it, free trade versus protectionism. It is whether the world trading system will be regulated by private companies that are answerable only to the rich and powerful, and are profoundly unequipped for the task of processing complex information for the sake of society, or by states built to assess risk and to be answerable to all citizens.

It would be Pollyannaish to deny that grave dangers abound. The last time a free-trade system unwound, when Britain's "invisible empire" vanished almost overnight in the 1880s, one result was a scramble for territory. Europe's powers carved up Africa, then began to hack away at China, in a process that helped set the stage for the first world war.

Already today, two scrambles are under way. One aims to grab keystone parts of the global industrial system, as nations ranging from Japan to South Korea and China to France resurrect a variety of mercantilist tactics to seize and hold industrial operations. The other scramble is for greater control over natural resources, especially oil. Although neither scramble poses an immediate threat to peace, both only exacerbate the biggest danger the world now faces: the extreme fragility of our highly specialised, cross-border industrial systems.

By far the greatest obstacle to understanding the failings of post-cold-war globalisation is the US's own utopian ideology. For most of the nation's history, America was guided by deeply realistic thinking, and idealistic rhetoric was trotted out mainly to clothe cold strategic aims. But after the fall of the Berlin Wall, in that moment of self-congratulatory euphoria, much of the US's ruling elite came to believe the rhetoric itself. The result was a uniquely American, fin-de-siècle paganism - absolute faith in the ability of an all-determining market mechanism to deliver universal prosperity and peace, in perpetuity - which was then hawked abroad with evangelical zeal.

This is not the first time an imperial power has imagined a link between the workings of empire and the benevolent actions of some higher force. It is, however, the first time a power that strove so relentlessly to sit in the driver's seat of a world system then chose to close its eyes to the road.

It is the first time that the central director of a hyper-complex industrial system has had so little ability to process basic information about the workings of that system, which is also, by design, the central framework of its empire. The depth and intensity of America's trade utopianism becomes more astonishing as time wears on. Look at how the US treats oil politics and you will see the realistic America of old. The nation's leaders shape an energy policy, they intervene in markets, they invade oil-rich nations. But when it comes to the global trading system, America today operates on an entirely different set of principles. No one dares whisper the words "industrial policy". No one dares admit the degree to which the trade system is actually manipulated, not by any state but by companies built to straddle many states. No one dares admit the degree to which these companies tend to destroy not merely soft social infrastructure, such as pensions and wages, but basic production infrastructure.

The dangers of this perverse duality in the US mind are extreme. Yet even in America, the fantastic delusion of trade utopianism cannot last - it is neither logically nor physically sustainable. Indeed, as can be seen in the growing willingness of politicians in both parties to engage in xenophobic demagoguery, America's utopian fever seems to be breaking. This brings us back to the question of whether the nations of the world will, together, take proactive steps to expand an open global system, or will stumble into blind and destructive protectionism.

The biggest reason for hope is the prospect of a reformed, sober US. Once the American mind is exorcised of today's mechanistic utopianism, the most probable result will be a return to a far more realistic, practical, ethical internationalism. Rather than attempt to retreat into an equally impossible autarky, it is far more likely that America will re-embrace the responsibility of using state power to engineer markets and systems to serve its own people, while ceding to other states far more space to serve their citizens in ways of their own choosing. The next global system will be far more heterogeneous, cosmopolitan, liberal and flexible than today's.

Utopian universalism is dead. The sooner nations gather to bury its corpse - and harness, hobble or break up the immense companies that have grown so powerful in the shadow of that myth - the more likely we will be to save globalisation. This, of course, can happen only if we define globalisation, once again, as a political process that must be managed by nation states. The result may not be perfect, and it certainly will be no utopia. But it is the best we can expect on this earth. And that may be enough.

The writer, a senior fellow at the New America Foundation in Washington DC, is author of End of the Line: The Rise and Coming Fall of the Global Corporation (Doubleday)

FT - Neo-cons question Bush’s democratisation strategy

2006-05-31T00:23:00.000+03:00

Neo-cons question Bush’s democratisation strategy
By Guy Dinmore in Washington
Published: May 29 2006 21:52 | Last updated: May 29 2006 21:52
http://news.ft.com/cms/s/1f808bd2-ef54-11da-b435-0000779e2340.html

President George W. Bush has likened the “war on terrorism” to the cold war against communism.

Addressing military cadets graduating from West Point, Mr Bush reaffirmed at the weekend that the US “will not rest until the promise of liberty reaches every people in every nation”.

But as the US struggles to assert itself on the international stage, the president’s most radical supporters now dismiss this as mere rhetoric, and traditional conservatives are questioning the wisdom of a democratisation strategy that has brought unpleasant consequences in the Middle East.

Administration officials speak privately of a sense of fatigue over the worsening crisis in Iraq that has drained energy from other important policy issues. Senior officials are leaving – not so unusual in a second term, but still giving the sense of a sinking ship run in some quarters by relatively inexperienced crew.

Neo-conservative commentators at the American Enterprise Institute wrote last week what amounted to an obituary of the Bush freedom doctrine.

“Bush killed his own doctrine,” they said, describing the final blow as the resumption of diplomatic relations with Libya. This betrayal of Libyan democracy activists, they said, came after the US watched Egypt abrogate elections, ignored the collapse of the “Cedar Revolution” in Lebanon, abandoned imprisoned Chinese dissidents and started considering a peace treaty with Stalinist North Korea.

The neo-conservatives offered no explanation for desertion of the doctrine, other than a desire to make quick but transitory short-term gains. “The president continues to believe his own preaching, but his administration has become incapable of making the hard choices those beliefs require,” they wrote.

But the ranks of the neo-conservatives are also being depleted. In his new book, America at the Crossroads, Francis Fukuyama, perhaps the movement’s most outstanding intellectual force, confirms his defection from the brand concepts of “pre-emption, regime change, unilateralism and benevolent hegemony as put into practice by the Bush administration”.

“It seems to me better to abandon the label and articulate an altogether distinct foreign policy position,” he writes.

Advisers to the White House say it would be premature, however, to write off the doctrine of pre-emption, which was restated in the National Security Strategy released in March. But on Iran, for example, they believe the Bush administration is moving towards a cold war-style strategy of containment and deterrence with as broad an international coalition as possible.

Graham Fuller, former diplomat and intelligence officer, suggests the US is suffering from “strategic fatigue” brought on by “imperial over-reach”.

“The administration’s bark is minimised, and much of the bite seems gone,” he writes in the Nixon Center’s National Interest journal. “Has superpower fatigue set in? Clearly so, to judge by the administration’s own dwindling energy and its sober acknowledgment that changing the face of the world is a lot tougher than it had hoped.”

Short-term economic costs of the empire have been bearable, says Mr Fuller, but long-term indicators show it is not sustainable – massive domestic debt, growing trade imbalances, an extraordinary gap in wealth between rich and poor Americans, the growing outsourcing of jobs.

More immediately, the unprecedented unilateral character of the US exercise of global power has proved its undoing.

Condoleezza Rice, the secretary of state, has tried to redress this in Mr Bush’s second term, but key allies – Britain’s Tony Blair, for example – are also suffering from weakened credibility.

In contrast, Russia, which Mr Bush saw as a declining power when he came to office in 2001, is asserting itself on the international stage. So is China.

Neither wants to declare itself explicitly at odds with the US, but they share a common agenda and ability to stymie Washington’s will. This is seen in their policies towards Iran, North Korea, Syria, the new Palestinian government led by Hamas, and Venezuela.

“In the last few years, diverse countries have deployed a multiplicity of strategies and tactics designed to weaken, divert, complicate, limit, delay or block the Bush agenda through a death by a thousand cuts,” says Mr Fuller.

Even some traditional Republicans are challenging the concept that the global “war on terror” is the paramount issue for generations to come.

Richard Lugar, chairman of the Senate’s powerful foreign relations committee, suggested that “there are a good many who would feel that the possibilities for devastation of countries, including our own, may come much more from our myopia in terms of energy policy than our ability to track down the last of the al-Qaeda cells”.

Robert Jervis, professor of international politics at Columbia University, argues in the Washington Quarterly that the US system does not have the commitment to sustain the prolonged efforts required by Mr Bush’s “transformationalist” agenda.

WaPo - U.S. Urges Financial Sanctions On Iran

2006-05-29T17:05:00.000+03:00

U.S. Urges Financial Sanctions On Iran
White House Tries to Enlist Europe, Japan

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/28/AR2006052800999.html

By Dafna Linzer
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, May 29, 2006; A01

The Bush administration is pressing Europe and Japan to impose wide-ranging sanctions designed to stifle the Iranian leadership financially if diplomatic efforts fail to resolve an impasse over the country's nuclear program, according to internal government memos and interviews with three U.S. officials involved.

Developed by a Treasury Department task force that reports directly to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, the economic measures go far beyond the diplomatic pressure exerted by the Bush administration to date, both in scope of action and in objective.

The plan is designed to curtail the financial freedom of every Iranian official, individual and entity the Bush administration considers connected not only to nuclear enrichment efforts but to terrorism, government corruption, suppression of religious or democratic freedom, and violence in Iraq, Lebanon, Israel and the Palestinian territories. It would restrict the Tehran government's access to foreign currency and global markets, shut its overseas accounts and freeze assets held in Europe and Asia.

The United States, which has imposed unilateral sanctions on Iran for nearly three decades, would shoulder few of the costs of its ambitious new proposal. But internal U.S. assessments suggest that the sanctions could not hurt Tehran without causing significant economic pain for Washington's friends. That calculation has made the plan a difficult sell, especially in capitals such as Rome and Tokyo, which import significant quantities of Iranian oil.

"I have been very open with people about the costs that could fall on them," said Stuart Levey, Treasury undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, in a recent interview.

U.S. intelligence agencies have spent months trolling through the personal accounts of Iranian leaders in foreign banks, analyzing Iranian financial systems and transactions and assessing how the government does its banking. They have calculated the amount of foreign investment at stake and even which charities have connections to the Tehran government.

Decades of stand-alone U.S. sanctions on Iran, North Korea and Cuba have failed to bring down those countries' leaders or modify their behavior. But U.S. officials believe that if other Western allies join in a sanctions pact, it could magnify pressure on Iran in much the same way that some Bush administration officials believe U.N. sanctions helped persuade Libya to give up its nuclear weapons program in 2003.

With Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Japan on board, collective sanctions would "isolate the Iranian regime" and see it "shunned by the international financial community," according to one internal Bush administration memo.

Under the plan, the major allies involved would freeze Iranian government accounts and financial assets in their countries, much as the United States did after Iranian students took over the U.S. Embassy in Tehran in 1979. Iranian officials who appear on lists being drawn up by U.S. officials would be prevented from opening accounts, trading on foreign markets or obtaining credit.

U.S. officials said in interviews that it is their hope the allies will carry out the punitive measures if Iran refuses a package of incentives the Europeans are preparing to offer in coming weeks.

So far, potential partners have not jumped at the plan, raised again last week in London by senior diplomats from Washington and European capitals. European officials who spoke on the condition of anonymity attributed their reluctance to a reliance on Iranian oil, domestic legal constraints and the fear of being dragged toward another conflict in the Middle East.

In an effort to minimize financial risks, the plan does not include oil or trade embargoes. But, according to a Treasury Department assessment, it could jolt world oil prices nonetheless if Iran responds by limiting exports. The internal assessment also predicts additional economic repercussions for Western allies, such as trade loss, and adverse effects for the Iranian people as their government is squeezed out of global markets and foreign banks stop taking their business.

The potential side effects have led European officials to turn the pressure back on Washington to hold direct talks with Iran.

"The sanctions could make Iran miserable, and Iran can respond by making everyone miserable back," said one senior Western official, who consulted on the issue recently with Rice. "In the end, the whole world is miserable and Iran gets to keep its nuclear program."

Although sanctions would not be directed "at the country or people of Iran," the measures "can be expected to bear second-order consequences for the people of Iran," according to a footnote on a Treasury Department task force memo sent to Rice last month.

The task force, made up of financial investigators, analysts and intelligence officers, is part of a growing government effort -- at the White House, the State Department, the CIA and the Pentagon -- focused on Iran. While some parts of the administration are studying prospects for negotiations with Iran -- an ally turned enemy nearly 30 years ago -- others are preparing for increased isolation and the possibility of a military strike against nuclear installations.

For four years, President Bush has sought to isolate Iran and roll back its nuclear energy program, which could provide the Islamic republic with a pathway to a nuclear bomb. Over that time, Iran's capabilities and nuclear expertise have only advanced, while soaring crude prices have brought the oil-rich nation additional hard currency.

The situation has emboldened the Iranians and left the White House searching for leverage. Bush administration officials believe that one approach may be to prevent Tehran from spending money on the open market.

European governments have spent months considering travel bans and arms embargoes on Iran, both of which would be largely symbolic. U.S. officials now hope the Europeans will impose sharper sanctions on Iran, at some cost to themselves, as diplomacy fails to yield results.

In interviews, U.S. officials described the plan as a new approach to international sanctions and said they believe it could succeed if implemented correctly.

"I would argue that targeted sanctions are designed to have minimal effects on people," Levey said, "and more designed to have effect . . . on the government and the people in the government. We are trying to design things that are not intended to inflict harm on the people." Undersecretary of State R. Nicholas Burns and Levey first briefed their Western counterparts on aspects of the proposal at a meeting last month in Moscow.

But the impact on U.S. allies could be steep as well. A Treasury Department memo recently predicted that Britain, which does not import Iranian oil, faces a low level of financial risk if it agrees to implement the sanctions plan. Germany, which imports 1 percent of its oil from Iran, and France, which gets 6 percent, are deemed at medium financial risk, whereas Italy and Japan would be taking the largest risks. The assessment is considered internally "an initial -- first blush -- estimate based on each country's overall volume of exports to Iran, dependence on Iranian oil and degree of investment in Iran oil projects," according to the Treasury memo.

Japan exports nearly $1.3 billion worth of goods to Iran, has nearly $2 billion worth of oil projects there and gets about 12 percent of its oil from the country, which is approximately equivalent to what the United States buys from Saudi Arabia. Italy buys 9 percent of its oil from Iran, and has $3.2 billion in oil investments in the country and $2.7 billion worth of exports to Iran.

Originally, U.S. policymakers discussed plans for sanctions through the U.N. Security Council, but that has proved more difficult than convincing a handful of allies.

The new plan would operate outside the council's authority and would "not depend on recalcitrant countries," identified in one government document as China and Russia, which have resisted the idea of U.N. sanctions. But if they did not participate, Beijing and Moscow would also be spared any financial burden and be free to pick up lost European business with Iran.

In the hopes of encouraging other governments to act, the Treasury Department has pursued a secondary path, approaching private-sector banks in Europe and Japan, one by one, in the hopes that they will reject Iranian business on their own.

A similar strategy was successfully employed with a bank in Macau, off mainland China, that was doing business with North Korea.

So far, four financial institutions have signed on to the U.S. effort. "These institutions are looking at which way this is headed and are asking themselves if they want to get in front of this wave," Levey said.

NYT - Iran Chief Eclipses Power of Clerics

2006-05-28T22:26:00.000+03:00

May 28, 2006

Iran Chief Eclipses Power of Clerics

By MICHAEL SLACKMAN

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/28/world/middleeast/28iran.html?hp&ex=1148875200&en=3926c18faed214ea&ei=5094&partner=homepage

TEHRAN, May 27 — President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is trying to consolidate power in the office of the presidency in a way never before seen in the 27-year history of the Islamic Republic, apparently with the tacit approval of Iran's supreme leader, according to government officials and political analysts here.

That rare unity of elected and religious leadership at the highest levels offers the United States an opportunity to talk to a government, however combative, that has often spoken with multiple voices. But if Washington, which severed relations with Iran after the 1979 revolution, opened such a dialogue, it could lift the prestige of the Iranian president, who has pushed toward confrontation with the West.

Political analysts and people close to the government here say Mr. Ahmadinejad and his allies are trying to buttress a system of conservative clerical rule that has lost credibility with the public. Their strategy hinges on trying to win concessions from the West on Iran's nuclear program and opening direct, high-level talks with the United States, while easing social restrictions, cracking down on political dissent and building a new political class from outside the clergy.

Mr. Ahmadinejad is pressing far beyond the boundaries set by other presidents. For the first time since the revolution, a president has overshadowed the nation's chief cleric, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, on both domestic and international affairs.

He has evicted the former president, Mohammad Khatami, from his offices, taken control of a crucial research organization away from another former president, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, challenged high-ranking clerics on the treatment of women and forced prominent academics out of the university system.

"Parliament and government should fight against wealthy officials," Mr. Ahmadinejad said in a speech before Parliament on Saturday that again appeared aimed at upending pillars of the status quo. "Wealthy people should not have influence over senior officials because of their wealth. They should not impose their demands on the needs of the poor people."

In this theocratic system, where appointed religious leaders hold ultimate power, the presidency is a relatively weak position. In the multiple layers of power that obscure the governance of Iran, no one knows for certain where the ultimate decisions are being made. But many of those watching in near disbelief at the speed and aggression with which the president is seeking to accumulate power assume that he is operating with the full support of Ayatollah Khamenei.

"Usually the supreme leader would be the front-runner in all internal and external issues," said Hamidreza Taraghi, the political director of the strongly conservative Islamic Coalition Party. "Here we have the president out front on all these issues, and the supreme leader is supporting him."

Mr. Ahmadinejad is pursuing a risky strategy that could offer him a shot at long-term influence over the direction of the country — or ruin. He appears motivated at least in part by a recognition that relying on clerics to serve as the public face of the government has undermined the credibility of both, analysts here said.

The changing nature of Iran's domestic political landscape has potentially far-reaching implications for the United States. While Iran has adopted a confrontational approach toward the West, it has also signaled — however clumsily — a desire to mend relations. Though the content of Mr. Ahmadinejad's letter to President Bush was widely mocked here and in Washington for its religious focus and preachy tone, it played well to Iran's most conservative religious leaders. Analysts here said it represented both Mr. Ahmadinejad's independence and his position as a messenger for the system, and that the very act of reaching out was significant.

"If the U.S. had relations with Iran under the reform government, it would not have been a complete relationship," said Alireza Akhari, a retired general with the Revolutionary Guard and former deputy defense minister, referring to Mr. Khatami's administration. "But if there can be a détente now, that means the whole country is behind relations with the West."

Mr. Ahmadinejad is trying to outpace the challenges buffeting Iran, ones that could undermine his presidency and conservative control. The economy is in shambles, unemployment is soaring, and the new president has failed to deliver on his promise of economic relief for the poor. Ethnic tensions are rising around the country, with protests and terrorist strikes in the north and the south, and students have been staging protests at universities around the country.

Mr. Ahmadinejad's critics — and there are many — say that the public will turn on him if he does not improve their lives, and soon. It may ultimately prove impossible to surmount these problems while building a new political elite, many people here said.

"The real issue here is we now have a government with no experience running a country and dealing with foreign policy," said Nasser Hadian, a political science professor at Tehran University and childhood friend of the president.

Mr. Ahmadinejad, who was elected last June, has adopted an ideologically flexible strategy. He has called for restoring the conservative values of the Islamic Revolution, yet at the same time has relaxed enforcement of strict Islamic social codes on the street. During the spring, when the warm weather sets in, young women are often harassed by the volunteer vigilantes known as the Basiji for their dress, but not this year. More music seems to be available in stores than in the past — small but telling changes, people here say.

If there is one consistent theme to his actions, it is the concept of seeking justice, reflecting a central characteristic of Shiite Islam. In more temporal terms, his strategy appears to be two-pronged: to reinforce his support among hard-liners with sharp attacks on Israel and the West, for example, while moving to appease a society weary of the social and economic challenges of life in the Islamic republic.

"He is reshaping the identity of the elite," said a political science professor in Tehran who asked not to be identified so as not to affect his relations with government officials. "Being against Jews and Zionists is an essential part of this new identity."

Mr. Ahmadinejad has been far freer to maneuver than his predecessor, Mr. Khatami, whose movement for change frightened religious leaders. Instead of having to prove his fealty to the system, Mr. Ahmadinejad has been given — or has taken — the opportunity to try to calm the streets. Perhaps most surprising, the man who was rumored to want to segregate men and women on elevators and even sidewalks has emerged as a proponent of women's rights, challenging some of the nation's most powerful religious leaders.

"I believe Ahmadinejad's government will be the most secular we have had since the start of the revolution," said Mahmoud Shamsolvaezin, a journalist and political analyst. "The government is not a secular one with secular thought. Ahmadinejad is a very religious man. But the government recognizes it has no choice, this is what the public demands."

Mr. Ahmadinejad called for allowing women into stadiums, in an attempt to reverse a post-revolution ban when religious leaders decreed that sports arenas were not the proper environment for women. Four grand ayatollahs objected to his decision, but he backed down only when the supreme leader stepped in. Even then, Mr. Ahmadinejad said he was suspending the decision, not canceling it.

Most significant, during the discussion of the stadium issue, the president defended women in a way that put him outside the mainstream of conservative Islamic discourse, even beyond Iran's borders.

"Unfortunately, whenever there is talk of social corruption, fingers are pointed at women," Mr. Ahmadinejad said, in comments that for a leader in this society were groundbreaking. "Shouldn't men be blamed for the problems, too?"

The president's strategy is also aimed at limiting political challenges to the system. While political arrests are down, and the government has not moved to close privately held newspapers, it has staged a few crucial arrests — sending a chill through intellectual and academic circles — and it has pressured newspapers to be silent on certain topics, like opposition to the nuclear program.

He also has struck back at those who would undermine or mock him. The local press reported that the president became so incensed with jokes about his personal hygiene that were being exchanged via text messages on cellphones, that he had the messages stopped and people at the top of the cellphone system punished.

Mr. Ahmadinejad offered voters change and promises to improve the lives of the poor, who make up the majority of this country. But he has been unable to push through economic changes by personal fiat, as he has done in the political realm. He ordered the banks, for example, to lower interest rates, and was rebuffed by the head of the central bank. He offered to give inexpensive housing loans to the poor — but with only 300,000 available, more than 2 million people applied. The program will cost the government more than $3 billion.

He has traveled around the country, promising to dole out development projects the government can hardly afford. In the last year, the cost of construction materials has jumped 30 to 50 percent, and prices of dairy products have increased by more than 15 percent. Many people are asking how this can happen when the price of oil is so high.

Without a strong grasp of economics, and an economy that is almost entirely in the hands of the government, Mr. Ahmadinejad has grappled with ways to inject oil revenue into the system without causing inflation to soar. At the same time, the volatile political situation has caused capital flight and limited foreign investment as the needs of the public continue to grow alongside the president's promises.

In politics, the president by turns ignores and confronts those who have opposed him from the start, whether conservative or liberal, all the while playing to the masses.

"Ahmadinejad knows there is a big gap between the intellectual elite and the masses, and he knows how it serves his interest," said Emadedin Baghi, director of a prisoners' rights group. "He is playing to the masses and trying to widen this gap."

He has managed to sideline opponents like Mr. Rafsanjani, either through his own initiative or with the back-channel support of Mr. Khamenei, the supreme leader. Mr. Rafsanjani, a midlevel cleric whom Mr. Ahmadinejad defeated in a runoff for the presidency, "has been undermined, he's not a powerful person anymore," said Muhammad Atrianfar, a close ally of Mr. Rafsanjani and publisher of the daily newspaper Shargh. He said Mr. Rafsanjani had tried to get the supreme leader to rein the president in, but was unable to convince him.

Mr. Rafsanjani is representative of the class of people — wealthy and influential from the first generation of the revolution — that the president is trying to displace, said the retired general, Mr. Akhari.

Nazila Fathi contributed reporting for this article.

NYT - U.S. Is Debating Talks With Iran on Nuclear Issue

2006-05-27T13:11:00.000+03:00

May 27, 2006

U.S. Is Debating Talks With Iran on Nuclear Issue

By STEVEN R. WEISMAN

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/27/world/middleeast/27iran.html?hp&ex=1148788800&en=602d1881e4ca95b7&ei=5094&partner=homepage

WASHINGTON, May 26 — The Bush administration is beginning to debate whether to set aside a longstanding policy taboo and open direct talks with Iran, to help avert a crisis over Tehran's suspected nuclear weapons program, European officials and Americans close to the administration said Friday.

European officials who have been in contact with the administration in recent weeks said the discussion was heating up, as Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice worked with European foreign ministers to persuade Iran to suspend its efforts to enrich uranium.

European leaders make no secret of their desire for the United States to join in the talks with Iran, if only to show that the Americans have gone the extra mile to avoid a confrontation that could spiral into a fight over sanctions or even military action.

But since the Iranian revolution of 1979 and the crisis over the seizure of American hostages in November that year, the United States has avoided direct talks with Iran. There were sporadic contacts during the war in Afghanistan, in the early stages of the Iraq war and in the days after the earthquake in Bam, Iran, at the end of 2003.

European officials say Ms. Rice has begun discussing the issue with top aides at the State Department. Her belief, they say, is that ultimately the matter will have to be addressed by the administration's national security officials, whether talks with Iran remain at an impasse or even if there is some progress.

But others who know her well say she is resisting on the ground that signaling a willingness to talk would show weakness and disrupt the delicate negotiations with Europe. Ms. Rice is also said to fear that the administration might end up making too many concessions to Iran.

Administration officials said President Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld have opposed direct talks, even through informal back channels. As a result, many European officials say they doubt that a decision to talk is likely soon.

The prospect of direct talks between the United States and Iran is so politically delicate within the Bush administration that the officials who described the emerging debate would discuss it only after being granted anonymity.

Those officials included representatives of several European countries, as well as Americans who said they had discussed the issue recently with people inside the Bush administration. Some of the officials made clear that they favored direct talks between the United States and Iran.

State Department officials refused to talk about the issue, even anonymously. But over the last week, administration spokesmen have been careful not to rule out talks.

Discussion about possible American contacts with Iran has been fueled not simply by the Europeans, but by a growing chorus of outsiders with ties to the administration who have spoken out in favor of talks.

Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, in a recent column in The Washington Post, raised the possibility that the recent rambling letter from President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to President Bush — dismissed by Ms. Rice as an offensive tirade— could be seen as an opportunity to open contacts.

Both Richard N. Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations and a former top aide to Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, and Richard L. Armitage, the former deputy secretary of state under Mr. Powell, have also advocated talks with Iran.

"Diplomacy is much more than just talking to your friends," Mr. Armitage said in a telephone interview. "You've got to talk to people who aren't our friends, and even people you dislike. Some people in the administration think that diplomacy is a sign of weakness. In fact, it can show that you're strong."

Mr. Armitage held the last high-level discussions with Iran, after the Bam earthquake. In November 2004, Mr. Powell sat next to the Iranian foreign minister at a dinner during a conference in Egypt on Iraq, but he said they engaged only in small talk.

The United States has stayed out of the talks with Iran, which began in late 2004 and got new life last summer when, with American endorsement, the Europeans offered to help Iran integrate politically and economically with the West if it ended its nuclear ambitions.

Also on the table were unspecified security guarantees suggesting that Iran would not have to worry about outside efforts to topple the government.

The Europeans are now working with the United States, Russia and China on a revised package of economic, political and nuclear energy incentives if Iran ended its nuclear enrichment activities. Also being sought, at least by the Europeans and the United States, is an agreement to take Iran to the United Nations Security Council if it continues to defy the demands for compliance on nuclear issues.

European officials say the discussions about possible American-Iranian contacts are not part of these talks, but would be a way to improve the atmosphere with Iran.

Among the European diplomats who have urged Ms. Rice to consider direct contacts with Iran are Germany's foreign minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, and the European Union's foreign policy chief, Javier Solana. The German chancellor, Angela Merkel, raised the issue with President Bush when she visited Washington earlier this year.

"What's interesting about Rice is that she listens when you make your case," a European official said.

Another European diplomat said, "It's a European aspiration for talks to happen," but added, "Nothing is likely at the moment." Still another European diplomat said of the Americans that "everyone and their brother has been telling them to do it."

One reason senior administration officials do not like the idea of talking with Iran, many of them say, is that they are not certain Iranian leaders would respond positively. A rebuff from Iran, even to a back-channel query, is to be avoided at all costs, various officials agree.

The administration, for example, has been embarrassed by the on-again, off-again possibility of talks with Iran on Iraq, which were authorized by Ms. Rice late last year.

The concern, some say, is that talking to Iran only about Iraq will anger Sunni dissidents in Iraq, reinforcing the Sunni-led insurgency while enhancing the status of Iraqi Shiites, whose strong ties to Iran make Washington uneasy.

On the other hand, the American ambassador to Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad, was said to be eager to enlist Iran in helping to deal with Iranian-backed Shiite militias, which are accused of carrying out killings and kidnappings of Sunnis in Iraq.

Some Europeans favor American participation in the European-Iranian talks, at least down the road. Others raise the possibility of informal contacts through nongovernmental organizations or policy institutes.

Incentives and possible sanctions against Iran are to be the focus of negotiations between the United States and the European nations in coming days and weeks.

The United States is resisting the Europeans' desire to increase economic incentives for Iran, because that would involve a lifting of American sanctions on European businesses that helped Iran. At the same time, Russia and China are resisting the idea of seeking a new resolution at the United Nations Security Council that could be seen as clearing the way for sanctions or possible military action against Iran.

David E. Sanger contributed reporting for this article.

Tony Judt - Why Israel cannot always rely on America's helping hand - FT

2006-05-26T23:30:00.000+03:00

Why Israel cannot always rely on America's helping hand
By Tony Judt
Published: May 23 2006 03:00 | Last updated: May 23 2006 03:00
http://news.ft.com/cms/s/26d2c3a6-ea12-11da-a33b-0000779e2340.html

By the age of 58 a country - like a man - should have achieved a certain maturity. After nearly six decades of existence we know, for good and ill, who we are and how we appear to others, warts and all. And though we still harbour occasional illusions about ourselves, we know they are, for the most part, just illusions. In short, we are adults.

But the state of Israel, which has just turned 58, remains curiously immature. The country's social transformations - and its many economic achievements - have not brought the political wisdom that usually accompanies age. Seen from outside, Israel still comports itself like an adolescent: confident of its uniqueness; certain that no one "understands"; quick to take offence, and to give it. Like many adolescents, Israel is convinced - and aggressively asserts - that it can do as it wishes; that its actions carry no consequences; that it is immortal.

That, Israeli readers will say, is the prejudiced view of the outsider. What looks from abroad like a self-indulgent, wayward country is simply an independent little state doing what it has always done: protecting its interests in an inhospitable part of the globe.

Why should embattled Israel even acknowledge foreign criticism, much less act on it? Because the world and its attitudes have changed. It is this change - largely unrecognised in Israel - to which I want to draw attention. Before 1967 Israel may have been tiny and embattled, but it was not typically hated: certainly not in the west. Most admirers (Jews and non-Jews) knew little about the Palestinian catastrophe of 1948. They preferred to see in the Jewish state the last incarnation of the 19th century idyll of agrarian socialism - or else a paragon of modernising energy, "making the desert bloom".

I remember in the spring of 1967 how student opinion at Cambridge University was overwhelmingly pro-Israel before the Six-Day War - and how little attention was paid either to the Palestinians or to Israel's collusion with France and Britain in the disastrous 1956 Suez adventure. For a while these sentiments persisted. The pro-Palestinian enthusiasms of post-1960s radical groups were offset by growing public acknowledgement of the Holocaust. Even the inauguration of illegal settlements and the invasion of Lebanon did not shift the international balance of opinion.

But today everything is different. We can see, in retrospect, that Israel's victory in June 1967 and its occupation of the territories it conquered then have been the Jewish state's very own nakba: a moral and political catastrophe. Israel's actions in the West Bank and Gaza have magnified its shortcomings to a watching world. The routines of occupation and repression were once familiar only to an informed minority; today, computer terminals and satellite dishes put Israel's behaviour under daily global scrutiny. The result has been a complete transformation in the international view of Israel.

The universal shorthand symbol for Israel, reproduced in political cartoons, is the Star of David emblazoned on a tank. Today the universal victims, the emblematic persecuted minority, are not Jews but Palestinians. This shift does little to advance the Palestinian case but it has redefined Israel forever. Israel's long-cultivated persecution mania no longer elicits sympathy. The country's national narrative of macho victimhood appears to many now as simply bizarre: a collective cognitive dysfunction. Israel, in the world's eyes, is a normal state; but one behaving in abnormal ways. As for the charge that criticism of Israel is implicitly anti-Semitic, this is in danger of becoming a self-fulfilling assertion: Israel's reckless behaviour, and its insistent identification of all criticism with anti-Semitism, is now the leading source of anti-Jewish sentiment in western Europe and much of Asia.

If Israel's leaders have been able to ignore such developments it is because they have counted on the unquestioning support of the US - the one country where the claim that anti-Zionism equals anti-Semitism is still echoed by mainstream politicians and the media. This confidence in unconditional US approval may prove to be Israel's undoing. For something is changing in America. Israel and the US appear increasingly bound together in a symbiotic embrace, whereby the actions of each party exacerbate their common unpopularity abroad. But whereas Israel has no choice but to look to America, the US is a Great Power - and Great Powers have interests that eventually transcend the local obsessions of even the closest client states. It seems to me suggestive that the recent essay "The Israel Lobby" by John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, published in March in the London Review of Books, provoked so much debate. It is true that, by their own account, the authors could not have published their indictment of the influence of the "Israel lobby" on US foreign policy in a major US-based journal. But the point is that 10 years ago they probably could not have published it at all. And while the ensuing debate generated more heat than light, it is of great significance.

The fact is that the disastrous Iraq invasion and its aftermath have set in train a sea-change in America's foreign-policy debate. It is becoming clear to prominent thinkers across the political spectrum - from erstwhile neo-conservative interventionists such as Francis Fukuyama to hard-nosed realists such as Mr Mearsheimer - that in recent years the US has suffered a catastrophic loss of international influence and degradation of its image. There is much repair work ahead, above all in Washington's dealings with economically and strategically vital regions of the world. But this cannot succeed while US foreign policy is tied by an umbilical cord to the needs andinterests of one small Middle Eastern country of little relevance to America's long-term concerns - a country that is, in the words of the Mearsheimer/Walt essay, a strategic burden. That essay is thus an indication of the direction of debate in the US about its peculiar ties to Israel. Of course, it generated fierce criticism - and, just as they anticipated, the authors have been charged with anti-Semitism. But it is striking how few people now take that accusation seriously, so predictable has it become. This is bad for Jews as it means that genuine anti-Semitism may also cease to be taken seriously. But it is worse for Israel.

From one perspective, Israel's future is bleak. Not for the first time, a Jewish state is on the vulnerable periphery of someone else's empire: wilfully blind to the danger that its indulgent excesses might ultimately push its imperial mentor beyond the point of irritation, and heedless of its own failure to make any other friends. Yet, modern Israel still has options. Precisely because the country is an object of such universal mistrust, a truly statesmanlike shift in its policies (dismantling of big settlements, opening unconditional negotiations with Palestinians and the like) could have disproportionately beneficial effects.

Such a radical realignment of strategy would entail a difficult reappraisal of every illusion under which the country and its political elite have nestled. Israel would have to acknowledge that it no longer has any special claim on international sympathy or indulgence; that the US will not always be there; that colonies are always doomed unless you are willing to expel or exterminate the indigenous population.

Other countries and their leaders have understood this: Charles de Gaulle saw that France's settlement in Algeria was disastrous for his country and, with outstanding political courage, withdrew. But when de Gaulle came to that realisation he was a mature statesman, aged nearly 70. Israel cannot afford to wait that long. The time has come for it to grow up.

The writer is director of the Remarque Institute at New York University

Philip Stephens - Blair and Bush will not bridge still-troubled Atlantic waters - FT

2006-05-26T17:57:00.000+03:00

Blair and Bush will not bridge still-troubled Atlantic waters By Philip Stephens
>Published: May 26 2006 03:00 | Last updated: May 26 2006 03:00
http://news.ft.com/cms/s/f19acbf8-ec54-11da-b3e2-0000779e2340.html

The Middle East, China, India, globalisation. The other day I listened to a senior official in George W. Bush's administration enumerate Washington's foreign policy concerns. The list was unremarkable. The omissions were striking. Here was another reminder, if one were needed, of just how far the world's strategic centre of gravity has shifted.

Unsurprisingly, the drive to combat Islamist terrorism and to extend democracy in the Middle East headed the list. With fires still raging in Iraq, Iran pressing ahead with its nuclear programme and a continuing stand-off between Israelis and Palestinians, it could scarcely have been otherwise.

The concern about China's rise, the official said, was to ensure it became a responsible stakeholder in the global system. A cynical translation would say this means that, in return for a place at the top table, Beijing accepts the (US-made) rules of the game. Another interpretation might add that at some point China must recognise it cannot indefinitely pursue a values-free foreign policy. Witness its recent role in stalling international action over Darfur.

With India, the US hope is not so much to mould the behaviour of an emerging great power as to build a strong bilateral alliance - not least, though this is always denied, to balance China. As for globalisation, the concern is to ensure that everyone plays by liberal market rules.

The common denominator is that all these preoccupations are located outside what diplomats call the Euro-Atlantic space. The US still has important interests in Europe. It worries about Russia's use of gas as a blunt instrument of foreign policy and about Moscow's interference in the affairs of would-be democratic neighbours such as Ukraine.

Europe, though, is now part of Washington's peripheral vision. For more than four decades, it was the geographical cockpit of a shared strategic imperative. Without the cold war, the transatlantic relationship has become one of choice rather than necessity. If much of the history of the past century was written in Europe, that of the 21st will be made largely in Asia.

During the past year or so we have seen the restoration of good manners between the US and Europe. In different ways both sides have been humbled - America by the limits to its power evidenced by the insurgency in Iraq, Europe by internal divisions and the absence of convincing political leadership. So the French and the Americans have stopped sniping at each other and, with the election as chancellor of Angela Merkel, Germany has repositioned itself as a mediator. Much of the rancour has gone from the argument about Iraq and there has been a significant effort to build a common front towards Iran.

All this is sensible. The Center for Strategic and International Studies, an influential Washington think-tank, makes a powerful case for rebuilding the partnership. At a recent CSIS conference in Germany I heard senior figures from both sides of the Atlantic offer a compelling exposition of the mutual benefits. The shared interest in forestalling Iran's nuclear ambitions should speak for itself. So, too, should a quest to persuade Hamas to forswear violence against Israel in favour of political engagement.

"Should", though, is not the same as "will" or "does". For all that the rhetoric is warmer and the US has rediscovered the mechanics of diplomacy, the sense of distance between the two sides is palpable. Even where they agree on the objective - as in the case of preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability - they see the world through different lenses. The impatience for pre-emptive action of the sole superpower still collides with the European predilection for thumb-sucking.

Mr Bush and Tony Blair might be expected to defy this continental drift. Both have been governing in a sea of political troubles and, over time, they have become more candid about some of their differences. But they have dutifully suppressed their different political backgrounds and outlooks in the cause of the transatlantic solidarity.

At their White House meeting this week the two leaders have been sharing some good (in a strictly relative sense) news about Iraq. For the first time since 2003 they see a possible pathway out of the quagmire. The prime minister's visit to Baghdad this week following the formation of a new Iraqi government has hardened the expectation that the troops will soon begin to return home.

We cannot call it a timetable or an exit strategy. A conditional drawdown is as far as officials will go. Whatever the public utterances, though, the two leaders anticipate a steep reduction in the military commitment during the next 12 to 24 months. One scenario sees US forces in Iraq being cut from 130,000 to 100,000 by the end of this year, with a further steady decline throughout 2007. In what condition the departure of foreign forces will leave Iraq - some would say better, some worse - is far less certain.

Mr Blair, meanwhile, will press Mr Bush for a more flexible US stance towards Iran and Hamas. The prime minister is as determined as the president that Iran should not acquire nuclear weapons. But my sense is that he also believes that Iranians should be presented with a worthwhile choice - significant incentives as well as threats. Likewise Hamas. Refusing to treat with a Palestinian authority committed to violence against Israel should not preclude setting out the gains available to Hamas were it to opt instead for political engagement.

The paradox is that, for all the closeness of the personal relationship with Mr Bush, Mr Blair's view on such issues describes almost perfectly the difference between European and American approaches. In a speech in Washington today, the prime minister will call for the reform and modernisation of the United Nations and other institutions central to the multilateral system. Mr Blair, like most Europeans, wants to refurbish and renew the international order created largely by the Americans after the end of the second world war. Though few now believe it, the desire to preserve the global system was one of the reasons he was ready to go to war in Iraq.

Here, however, lies the critical divide with his host. For all that Mr Bush has embraced diplomacy in recent months, his administration still bridles at the constraints of multilateralism. Europeans, including Mr Blair, want a rules-based system of global governance. Mr Bush still cannot see why anyone would want to challenge the pax Americana.

Efraim Halevy - A View from inside the Mossad - Washington Institute

2006-05-26T17:31:00.000+03:00

PolicyWatch #1107: Special Forum Report

Understanding the Middle East: A View from inside the Mossad

Featuring Efraim Halevy
May 25, 2006

http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2472

On May 3, 2006, Efraim Halevy addressed The Washington Institute’s Special Policy Forum. Efraim Halevy is head of the Center for Strategic and Policy Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He served as head of the Mossad from 1998 to 2002 and head of Israel’s National Security Council from 2002 to 2003. He was previously Israel’s ambassador to the European Union. His most recent book is Man in the Shadows. The following is a rapporteur’s summary of his remarks.

Intelligence in Policymaking

In the current global circumstances, the role of intelligence gathering and analysis in policymaking has become increasingly important. As a result, intelligence leaders have ever more influence in the policymaking process. This is particularly the case in Israel, where some of the political leadership’s most significant decisions came on the heels of Mossad and Military Intelligence initiatives and assessments.

One case in which the decisions of intelligence personnel were adopted by the political leadership is the construction of Israel’s security fence. At the time the fence was first proposed, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon opposed it, believing that it would ultimately be the point of departure for determining the final borders of Israel. Sharon only accepted the plan when he was pressed by the heads of the security services, who argued that without the fence, the Israeli military and security establishments would be unable to provide Israelis with adequate protection from Palestinian terror attacks.

As a result of intelligence becoming increasingly important to political decisions, leaders have become immersed in intelligence and read it in enormous quantities. Former Israeli prime ministers Yitzhak Shamir and Sharon were particularly attentive to intelligence. Shamir often spent nights reading intelligence reports; he knew the names of sources and was often able to point out discrepancies from one report to the next. Sharon had previously served as the intelligence officer of northern and southern command; as prime minister, he would delve into intelligence operations almost compulsively. As a consequence, intelligence chiefs had the ear of these prime ministers, and the role of intelligence officials in influencing policy increased.

Intelligence officers are uniquely positioned to effectively advise political leaders on policy. This is because they are equipped with sensitive, often exclusive information, as well as the ability to extrapolate from it a series of policy options. In Israel’s approach toward the Palestinians, security services have been critical in making assessments and proposing policies after terrorist attacks.

Given the increasing importance of intelligence officers in policymaking, governments must insure that their intelligence offers are recruited from the best and the brightest. It is critical that intelligence officers enjoy the support of the greater public—not just that confidence of the president or the powers that be.

The Art of Intelligence

In the field of intelligence, it is essential that responsibility be wed to authority. There must be a direct line of authority, command, and responsibility between the head of state and the highest operational level in the intelligence community. In this vein, the creation of the post of director of national intelligence in the United States was a mistake. Its ultimate consequence is removing the president from oversight of each intelligence agency. Given the stakes in today’s global environment, it is critical for leaders to be intimately involved in the intelligence services. As a matter of principle, there should be a clear chain of command within the intelligence community, and the senior level should report directly to the political leadership, not to a liaison.

The commission appointed to investigate the September 11 attacks faulted the American intelligence community with a lack of imagination. It argued, compellingly, that given all the facts known at the time, such an attack should have been imagined. On the other hand, the Senate committee that investigated the use of intelligence in the runup to the Iraq war faulted the intelligence community for being overzealous in assuming that Iraq still possessed weapons of mass destruction. This sends the conflicting messages that intelligence agencies should imagine the worst cases and that they should restrain their imaginations.

The Value of Leadership in the Arab World

In the months before the 1991 Gulf War, Jordan’s King Hussein met regularly with Israeli intelligence officials; a relationship of confidence developed. When discussing the countdown to war, King Hussein often observed that the West failed to understand Saddam Hussein. Too often, the King argued, Saddam was viewed as a bloodthirsty dictator and, in his invasion of Kuwait, a violator of international law. To the Arab masses, however, Saddam was a modern day Nebuchadnezzar who commands respect. Visits to other Arab capitals confirmed this: the simultaneous fear and respect for Saddam was profound. As war was about to break out, thousands demonstrated in Muslim capitals.

The importance of leadership to a nation is a key element within the Muslim world that cannot be ignored. Too little weight is given to the fears and reservations of people in the region on matters of such consequence. The West has erred in this respect.

Challenges Facing Israel

Hamas is a central element in Palestinian society—it is well organized and highly motivated, and has put in motion an effective machine of education, health, and social welfare. The strength of Hamas’s popularity within Palestinian society is even greater than the percentages indicate, and no resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can come about without Hamas being part of the solution. This is not the official view in Israel.

Every word of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad must be taken at face value. He is sincere in wanting to destroy Israel and will certainly do everything he can to achieve success in this area. But he will not succeed. Currently, Iran is maneuvering very effectively, but it is also feeling mounting pressure. While the final outcome is difficult to predict, the international community is unlikely to allow Iran to obtain nuclear weapons capabilities. Because Iran was at the center of the Israeli intelligence community’s work for the last fifteen years, Israel has many options for dealing with Tehran. Israel is amply prepared to head off this challenge should it boil over.

This rapporteur’s summary was written by Eric Trager.

Ignatius - It's Time to Engage With Iran - WaPo

2006-05-26T15:32:00.000+03:00

It's Time to Engage With Iran

By David Ignatius
Friday, May 26, 2006; A21

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/25/AR2006052501986.html

"Only connect." That was the trademark line of E.M. Forster's great novel "Howards End." And it's a useful injunction in thinking about U.S. strategy toward Iran and the wider conflicts between the West and the Muslim world.

We are in the early stages of what the Centcom commander, Gen. John Abizaid, calls "the first war of globalization, between openness and closed societies." One key to winning that war, Abizaid told a small group of reporters at the Pentagon yesterday, is to expand openness and connection. He called al-Qaeda "the military arm of the closed order." The same could be said of the extremist mullahs in Tehran who are pushing for nuclear weapons.

America's best strategy is to play to its strengths -- which are the open exchange of ideas, backed up by unmatched military power. The need for connection is especially clear in the case of Iran, which in isolation has remained frozen in revolutionary zealotry like an exotic fruit in aspic. Yet some in the Bush administration cling to the idea that isolation is a good thing and that connectivity will somehow weaken the West's position. That ignores the obvious lesson of the past 40 years, which is that isolation has usually failed (as in the cases of Cuba and North Korea), while connectivity has usually succeeded (as in the cases of the Soviet Union and China).

A telling example was the decision to engage the Soviet Union in 1973 through the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe. At the time, some conservatives argued that it was a dangerous concession that the Soviets might interpret as a symbol of weakness. But the CSCE provided a crucial forum for dissidents in Russia and Eastern Europe, and with astonishing speed the mighty edifice of Soviet power began to crumble. Similar warnings about showing weakness in the face of an aggressive adversary were voiced when President Richard Nixon went to China in February 1972.

I cite this Cold War history because the moment has come for America to attempt to engage revolutionary Iran. The invitation for such a dialogue came this month in a letter to President Bush from Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad -- a man whose rabble-rousing, Israel-baiting career gave him the credentials, if that's the right word, to break a 27-year Iranian taboo on contacts with the Great Satan.

Ahmadinejad's letter clearly had the backing of Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. In the American context, that's like having the support of Vice President Cheney for a peace feeler. My own Iranian sources say there is broad consensus in Tehran that it is time for talks with the United States. "Iran wants to start discussions the same way the Chinese wanted discussions" with Nixon, an Iranian businessman named Ali Ettefagh told me in an e-mail this week. "Great Satan doesn't sell anymore. More than half the population was not born 27 years ago, and the broken record does not play well." The Iranian offer of dialogue, he says, "ought to be taken as an opportunity, if only to air out grievances and amplify differences."

I suspect Iran wants dialogue now partly because it perceives America's position in Iraq as weak and its own as strong. That may be true, but so what? Washington should still take yes for an answer. The United States and its European allies this week are crafting a package that, one hopes, will include everything the Iranian people could want -- except nuclear weapons. The bundle of goodies should stress connectivity -- more air travel to Iran, more scholarships for students, more exchanges, Iranian membership in the World Trade Organization. The mullahs may well reject these incentives as threatening, but that's the point. Their retrograde theocracy can't last long in an open world. This very week, about 40 police officers were injured in a clash with demonstrators at two Tehran universities. One of the hand-lettered protest signs captured in an Iranian photo said: "This is not a seminary, it is a university."

Karim Sadjadpour, an Iranian analyst with the International Crisis Group, noted in Senate testimony last week that opinion polls show 75 percent of Iranians favor relations with the United States. "Embarking on a comprehensive dialogue with Iran would provide the U.S. with the opportunity to match its rhetorical commitment to Iranian democracy and human rights with action," Sadjadpour said. He's right.

There's no guarantee that a policy of engagement will work. The Iranian regime's desire to acquire nuclear weapons may be so unyielding that Tehran and Washington will remain on a collision course. But America and its allies will be in a stronger position for responding to Iranian calls for dialogue. Openness isn't a concession by America, it's a strategic weapon.

davidignatius@washpost.com

Morton Abramowitz AKP-Amerika ilişkisini yazdı - Zaman

2006-05-26T14:56:00.000+03:00

Zaman

ABD eski büyükelçisi AKP-Amerika ilişkisini yazdı

http://www.zaman.com.tr/?bl=yorumlar&trh=20060525&hn=287741

Son üç yıldır, Amerikalı ve Türk yetkililerle uzmanlar Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerinde ardı arkası kesilmeyen yüksek nabız atışları ve harareti izleme gibi bir durum yaşadılar. Bunların büyük çoğunluğu hastanın sağlığı konusunda endişelendiler.

Endişelenmeliler de. Her iki ülkenin de birbirine yakın bir tarihi var ve güçlü ilişkileri sürdürmekte önemli çıkarları bulunmaktadır ve bu hususlar ilişkiler için mükemmel bir dayanak sağlıyor. Yine de, Türk-Amerikan ilişkileri son on yıldır sorunlu bir şekilde gelişti. Bunda en büyük pay, -Türkiye ve Birleşik Devletler de dahil- dünyanın radikal bir biçimde değişmesi ve kolayca başa çıkılamayacak zor belirsizlikleri ve meseleleri yaratmasındadır. Her iki ülke de meçhul sularda fırtınaya tutuldu. Bunlar: Irak ve İran’dır. Türkiye’de Amerika karşıtı duygular bir kez daha yaygınlaşıyor ve AK Parti’nin ezici çoğunluğuna rağmen iç politik durum çalkantılı. Son cinayetler politik yaşamdaki kutuplaşmayı ve harareti artırdı.

Türk ekonomisi iyi yolda, reformlar önemli!

Türkiye nihai olarak ekonomik bir dinamizm gösteriyor, IMF’ye ve ABD’ye daha az bağımlı ve yabancı yatırım ilk kez böylesine akmaya başladı. İç siyasi desiseler bu sürece nüfuz etmedikçe dinamizm devam etmeli. Politik açıdan, önemli reformlar yapılmaya devam ediliyor. Tüm bunlar Türkiye’nin güvenilirliğini artırıyor. Uluslararası açıdan, Türkiye enerji denkleminde ve dönüşüm geçiren Orta Asya’da önemli bir oyuncu haline dönüştü ve giderek artan şekilde Ortadoğu’yla ilgili meselelerin içine çekiliyor. Rusya ile ilişkileri zorluklarına rağmen hızla gelişiyor. En önemlisi, Türkiye’nin AB’ye üye olma hedefi enerjisini Avrupa ülkelerine doğru yöneltirken, artan ölçüde ABD’den uzaklaştırdı. Bununla birlikte, AB’deki düzensizlik ve Türkiye’nin üyeliği konusunda Avrupa halkındaki isteksizlik, üyelik yolundaki uzun gayretler ve hâlâ ihtiyaç duyulan bazı iç reformların yapılması konusunda Türkiye’de kayda değer bir gözden geçirmeye neden olabilir. Bu arada Amerikan dış politikası 11 Eylül’den sonra değişti, merkezini ve kaynaklarını terörizme karşı ve Ortadoğu’ya odakladı, böylece diğer bölgeler, müttefikleri ve uluslararası kurumlar üzerinde durmayı azalttı. Bunun sonuçlarından biri, Amerika üç yılın ve 300 milyar doların ardından kendini Irak sorunu içinde çırpınırken ve geçen hafta yeni bir hükümetin kurulmasına rağmen güvenlik sorununun aşılamadığı bir zeminde buldu. Aslında Irak, Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerinde büyük bir çatlak oluşturdu ve her iki taraf da bu zararı telafi etmeye çalışırken, Irak sorunu olduğu yerde durmaya devam ediyor. Her iki ülkenin de bir şekilde birleşik bir Irak’ın zuhur etmesinde büyük çıkarları bulunmaktadır, ancak bu, sonucun o doğrultuda olacağı anlamına gelmez. Aslında pek çok Türk gerçekte ABD’nin bu bölgede ve hatta Türkiye’de bağımsız bir Kürt devletinin kurulmasını istediğine inanıyor.

Türk laiklerden ABD’ye AKP baskısı...

Türkiye için Kuzey Irak’taki durum, Cumhuriyet’in doğuşundan beri hayati bir sorun olmayı sürdürüyor-Kürt nüfusunun geleceği. PKK’nın Türkiye’nin güneydoğusunda yeniden atağa geçmesiyle birlikte, Türk yetkililer giderek artan ölçüde halk desteğinden uzak bir savaşın ortasında diğer taleplerle çevrilen ve bu işe girişmek istemeyen Amerikan güçlerinin Kuzey Irak’taki PKK yuvalarını temizlemesi gerektiğine vurgu yapıyor. Amerikalılar PKK’yı yok etse bile, bu, Irak’taki fiili bir Kürt devletinin Türk Kürtleri üzerindeki psikolojik etkileri nedeniyle başka bir şekilde ortaya çıkan Kürt sorununu çözmeyecektir. Irak parçalara ayrılırsa, Türkiye Kuzey Irak’ta askerî yolla müdahil olma konusunda zor bir kararla karşı karşıya kalacaktır. Kısaca, Irak sorunu tatmin edici bir şekilde çözülünceye kadar, Türk-Amerikan ilişkileri ciddi bir riziko potansiyeli barındırmaktadır.

Yenice patlak veren, potansiyel açıdan büyük; ancak nerelere uzanacağı belirsiz bir İran sorunu, Türkiye-ABD ilişkilerini daha da sıkıntıya sokacaktır. Türkiye, İran’ın nükleer silah gücüne sahip olmamasını tercih ediyor. İran’ın elde etmesine izin verilirse, Türkler de Türkiye’nin de sahip olup olamayacağını sormaya başlayacaktır. Türkiye, ilk elde İran’a karşı caydırıcı yaptırım çabalarıyla yüz yüze gelecektir ki; bu da ciddi ekonomik ve iç politik sorunlar oluşturacaktır. Aynı zamanda, ABD’nin devasa sonuçları olacak bir hareketle İran’ın nükleer silah tesislerine saldırması gibi yüksek bir ihtimal bulunuyor ve muhtemelen Türk halkı bu olayı memnuniyetle karşılamayacaktır. İlişkilere yön verilmesini girift hale sokan bir diğer unsur da iki hükümetin birbirine karşı sıcak olmayışı ve birbirlerine karşı muğlak oluşu. Birbirleri ile temasta nispeten yeniler ve Irak savaşından bu yana güven tesis etmek zor olmuştu. AKP hükümeti daha ziyade Müslüman dünyası ile diplomasi hususuyla ilgileniyor ve pek çok Amerikan yetkilisine göre Bush’un Washington’undan ziyade Esad’ın Şam’ına daha yakınlar.

ABD, AKP’yi gözden çıkaramaz; çünkü...

Şubat ayındaki Hamas ziyareti, doğru ya da yanlış, Washington tarafından ters anlaşıldı. Pek çok Amerikalı muhafazakar, AKP hükümetinden dolayı düş kırıklığına uğradı ve Türkiye’nin yanlış bir yola girmesinden korkuyor. Bu arada göze çarpan bazı laik Türkler Washington’a geliyor ve AKP’nin altındaki halının bir şekilde çekilmesi gerektiğini ima ediyorlar. Her iki taraf da güçlü bir ilişki kurmak amacını taşıyor. ABD hâlâ, Batı’ya demirlenmiş güçlü demokratik bir Türkiye’nin hayati öneme sahip olduğuna inanıyor ve Türkiye’nin artan ekonomik sağlamlığının ve yükselen bölgesel nüfuzunun bölgenin istikrarına katkı sağlayabileceğini kabul ediyor. Demokratik, halkın oylarıyla seçilmiş, dinsel yönü olan, ABD’ye dost bir hükümet aynı zamanda İslam dünyasında demokrasinin geliştirilmesi gibi daha geniş küresel çabalarında ABD için çok daha hayati öneme haizdir. Türkiye için hiçbir ülke, içinde olduğu tehlikeli bölgede askerî üstünlüğü, dinamik ekonomisi, teknik ve bilimsel donanımlarıyla ABD’nin stratejik güvenilirliğinin yerini dolduramaz. Ancak siyaset de başını kaldırıyor. Türkiye’de politik sezon açıldı, hükümet birtakım baskılar altında ve ABD ilişkilerinin idaresi hususu iç politik mücadelede bir unsur olabilir.

Peki yapılacak şey nedir? Şu an, hiçbir şey Irak ve İran’daki belirsizliği azaltacağa benzemiyor. Her iki ülke için de yapacakları en iyi şey, görüş-alışveriş trafiğini sıklaştırmak, özellikle İran ve Irak konularında ve politikalarında tutarlı bir çizgi yakalamaya çalışmalılar; Türkiye durumunda özellikle halklarının eğitilmesi mevzuunda. Aynı zamanda gereksiz yıpranmalardan kaçınmak, Orta Asya’dan enerjiye, Rusya’ya ve Afganistan’a kadar ilişkilerimizde olumlu unsurları geliştirmeli ve bunlara vurgu yapmalıyız. Amerikalılar, Irak’taki PKK konusunda daha fazla şey yapabilir, Kıbrıslı Türklere yardım için yeni yollar bulabilir ve iç politik değişime hassas olan bir ekonominin altını kazacak olaylardan kaçınabilir. Türkiye’nin, gerçek bilgi alışverişleri yapılmadan Hamas benzeri diğer çabalardan kaçınması iyi olacaktır. Ancak üst düzey insanların Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerinde deneme yılı olacağa benzeyen süreçten el çekilmemesinden emin olunmasına ihtiyaç bulunmaktadır. Körfez Savaşı’na sebep olan Irak’ın Kuveyt işgalinde, dönemin Dışişleri Bakanı James Baker, dokuz ay içinde Türkiye’yi tam beş kez ziyaret etmişti.

Amerika’nın Türkiye eski Büyükelçisi Morton Abramowitz Zaman için yazdı

Turkish American Relations in a Sea of Troubles
by
Morton Abramowitz

For the past three years or so American and Turkish officials and cognoscenti have kept an incessant watch on the pulse and temperature of the Turkish-American relationship After all many are worried about the health of the patient. They should be.

Both countries have had a close history and retain important stakes in strong ties and that provides an excellent underpinning for relations. Nevertheless Turkish-American relations have been troubled for much of this decade. And that is fundamentally because the world including Turkey and the United States has changed radically, creating new issues and difficult uncertainties which cannot be easily managed. Both countries have entered turbulent, uncharted waters. Read: Iraq and down the pike Iran. Anti-American sentiment once again pervades Turkey and the domestic political situation is roiling despite the AK Party’s overwhelming majority. Recent murders have heightened the temperature and increased the polarization of political life.

Turkey is finally showing economic dynamism, it is far less dependent on the IMF and the US, and foreign investment has started to flow for the first time. Unless domestic politics get in the way that dynamism should continue. Politically, significant reforms continue to be made. All this is increasing Turkish confidence. Internationally Turkey has become an important player in the energy equation and in an evolving central Asia, and it has been increasingly drawn into Middle East affairs. Its relations with Russia have thrived although not without its complications. Most significant, its focus on joining the EU has directed its energies toward European countries and increasingly away from the US. The disarray in the EU and the public lack of enthusiasm in Europe for Turkish accession, however, may lead to considerable rethinking in Turkey of the long slog to membership and the major internal reforms still needed to be made.

Meanwhile American policy changed course after 9/11, shifting its focus and resources to counter terrorism and the Middle East and diminishing its emphasis on other regions and on its alliances and international institutions. One result is that the US has found itself still floundering in Iraq after three years and 300 billion dollars and rising with no great confidence as to what will be created there despite the establishment last week of a new government. Indeed Iraq produced the big fissure in Turkish-American relations, and while both sides have worked to repair the damage, the Iraq problem is not going away. Both countries have a great interest in seeing some sort of unified Iraq emerge but that does not mean it will happen. In fact Many Turks actually still believe that the US wants an independent Kurdish state to emerge there and even one in Turkey.

For Turkey the situation in northern Iraq raises in spades an existential question that has persisted since the birth of the Republic—the future of its Kurdish population. With the revival of the PKK war in Southeast Turkey Turkish authorities have emphasizes the need for American forces to clean out the PKK safe havens in Northern Iraq, which the Americans, beset by other demands in the midst of an increasingly unpopular war, do not want to take on. Even if the Americans cleaned out the PKK, it would not resolve the Kurdish issue, which is emerging in a new way because of the psychological impact on Turkish Kurds of the de facto Kurdish state in Iraq. If Iraq disintegrates, Turkey will face a difficult decision on military involvement in northern Iraq. In short until the Iraq problem is resolved satisfactorily Turkish-American relations have a serious downside potential.

The burgeoning Iran problem with its potentially great but uncertain spillover will further trouble US-Turkey relations. Turkey prefers Iran not to have a nuclear weapons capability. If it is allowed to obtain one, Turks will ask whether Turkey should pursue one. Turkey may first have to face determined efforts to sanction Iran, which will create serious economic and domestic political problems. There is also the real possibility that the US will attack Iran’s nuclear weapon facilities, a move with monumental consequences and not likely to be welcomed by the Turkish people to say the least.

Also complicating the management of relations is that the two governments are not warm and fuzzy with each other. They are relatively new in dealing with each other and trust has been hard to establish since the Iraq war. The AKP government seems much more interested in diplomacy in the Muslim world and to many American conservatives more at home in Assad’s Damascus than Bush’s Washington. The Hamas visit last February, rightly or wrongly, was ill received in Washington, which got no notice of it and would not have liked it any event. Many conservatives have become disenchanted with the AKP government and fear it is leading Turkey down a wrong path. Meanwhile prominent secular Turks come to Washington and intimate that the US government should somehow pull the rug out from under the AKP.

Both governments are interested in a strong relationship. The US still believes in the essentiality of a strong democratic Turkey anchored in the West and recognizes that Turkey’s increasing economic robustness and growing regional influence can contribute to the stability of the area. The success of a democratic, popularly elected, religiously oriented government friendly to the US also holds much interest for the US in its wider global efforts to promote democracy in the Islamic world. For Turkey no country can replace the US for strategic reliability in its still dangerous region, for its military predominance, and its dynamic economy and technical and scientific capabilities. But politics also rares its head. The political season has started in Turkey, the government is under severe pressures and management of US relations can become a factor in the domestic political struggle..

So what is to be done? Nothing now looks likely to reduce the uncertainty of Iraq and Iran. The best that can be done is for both countries to consult frequently, particularly on Iraq and Iran, and try to keep their policies together, and in the case of Turkey particularly to educate their publics. It is also necessary to avoid needless abrasions and to develop and stress the positive elements in our relations from central Asia and energy to Afghanistan The Americans can do more about the PKK in Iraq, find ways to help the Turkish Cypriots, and avoid incidents that can undermine an economy vulnerable domestic political change. Turkey would do well to avoid other Hamas like efforts without real consultations. But high level people are needed to make sure things not get out of hand in what looks to be a trying year for Turkish-American relations. Secretary of State James Baker visited Turkey five times in the nine months from the Iraq invasion of Kuwait to the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War.